An Empirical Assessment of Audio/Visual/Haptic Alerts and Warnings to Mitigate Risk of Phishing Susceptibility in Emails on Mobile Devices by Cooper, Molly Marie
Nova Southeastern University 
NSUWorks 
CCE Theses and Dissertations College of Computing and Engineering 
2020 
An Empirical Assessment of Audio/Visual/Haptic Alerts and 
Warnings to Mitigate Risk of Phishing Susceptibility in Emails on 
Mobile Devices 
Molly Marie Cooper 
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Share Feedback About This Item 
This Dissertation is brought to you by the College of Computing and Engineering at NSUWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in CCE Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more 








An Empirical Assessment of Audio/Visual/Haptic Alerts and Warnings to 








A Dissertation in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  









College of Computing and Engineering  














An Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to Nova Southeastern University in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
An Empirical Assessment of Audio/Visual/Haptic Alerts and Warnings to 
Mitigate Risk of Phishing Susceptibility in Emails on Mobile Devices 
 
By 




Phishing emails present a threat to both personal and organizational data. Phishing is a 
cyber-attack using social engineering. About 94% of cybersecurity incidents are due to 
phishing and/or social engineering. A significant volume of prior literature documented 
that users are continuing to click on phishing links in emails, even after phishing 
awareness training. It appears there is a strong need for creative ways to alert and warn 
users to signs of phishing in emails. 
The main goal of the experiments in this study was to measure participants’ time for 
recognizing signs of phishing in emails, thus, reducing susceptibility to phishing in 
emails on mobile devices. This study included three phases. The first phase included 32 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) that provided feedback on the top signs of phishing in 
emails, audio/visual/haptic pairings with the signs of phishing, and developmental 
constructs toward a phishing alert and warning system. The second phase included a pilot 
study with five participants to validate a phishing alert and warning system prototype.  
The third phase included delivery of the Phishing Alert and Warning System, (PAWS 
Mobile App ™) with 205 participants.  
 
The results of the first phase aligned the constructs for the alert and warning system. A 
female voice-over warning was chosen by the SMEs as well as visual icon alerts for the 
top signs of phishing in emails. This study designed, developed, as well as empirically 
tested the PAWS Mobile App, that alerted and warned participants to the signs of 
phishing in emails on mobile devices. PAWS displayed a randomized series of 20 
simulated emails to participants with varying displays of either no alerts and warnings, or 
a combination of alerts and warnings. The results indicated audio alerts and visual 
warnings potentially lower phishing susceptibility in emails. Audio and visual warnings 
appeared to have assisted the study participants in noticing phishing emails more easily, 
and in less time than without audio and visual warnings. The results of this study also 
indicated alerts and warnings assisted participants in noticing distinct signs of phishing in 
the simulated phishing emails viewed. This study implicates phishing email alerts and 
warnings applied and configured to email applications may play a significant role in the 
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 According to Clement (2018), the volume of email users has grown to more than 
3.8 billion and is projected to reach 4.3 billion by the year 2022. Email remains the most 
pervasive form of communication, while other technologies such as social networking, 
Instant Messaging (IM), chat, mobile IM, and others are also taking hold, email is still the 
most ubiquitous form of business communication (Clement, 2018). In addition, email is 
integral to the overall Internet experience as an email account (i.e. email address) is 
required to sign up to most online activities, including social networking sites, IM, and 
any other kind of account or presence on the Internet. In 2018, the total number of 
professional emails sent and received per day exceed 281 billion and is forecast to grow 
to over 333 billion by yearend 2022 (Radicati Group, 2018). Over the past two decades, 
email became an essential part of personal and business communication (Clement, 2018). 
It is estimated that 72% of users check their email via mobile smartphone, and 19% of 
users check email as soon as they arrive to work (Clement, 2018). However, users are 
still falling for signs of phishing in emails (Wash & Cooper, 2018) and collectively 
costing themselves and their employers millions of dollars annually. 
 Phishing and social engineering attacks target more than 37.3 million people per 
year, and costs organizations an average of $3.7 million annually (Abass, 2018). Phishing 
and social engineering encompass approximately 93% of information security incidents 




emails continue to present a significant threat to both personal and corporate data loss, 
even after phishing awareness training (Almomani et al., 2013; Carlton et al., 2018). 
Thus, it appears that there is a strong need for creative ways to warn and alert users to 
signs of phishing in emails.  
Problem Statement 
The overarching research problem this study addressed is the significant volume 
of users who continue to click on phishing links in emails, exposing them and/or their 
organizations to identity theft, monetary loss, and data loss (Aaron, 2010). Dakpa and 
Augustine (2017) defined phishing as one way to obtain sensitive data, usernames, 
passwords, and other information from a user to inflict future damage. The Anti-Phishing 
Working Group (2018) also described signs of phishing in emails including poor 
grammar, sense of urgency in the message, incorrect sender address, and requests for 
personal information. Other signs of phishing in emails include incorrect Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) in the email message, unfamiliar or inaccurate logo for a 
company, unfamiliar front, incorrect language translation, inconsistent greeting from 
common senders to the recipient, a request to update or verify information, an 
attachment, or an urgent request for a donation (Austin Technology, 2016).  
Phishing is a type of social engineering that is part of cybersecurity (Canfield, 
2018; Hernandez et al., 2016). According to the Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity 
Education (2017):  
“Cybersecurity is a computing-based discipline involving technology, people, 
information, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of 




information assurance; and began with more narrowly focused field of computer 
security.” (p. 16)  
Termed as ‘System 2 Thinking Mode’ (S2) Kahneman (2011), describes an 
individual in a more aware state that s/he can utilize when making important decisions. 
Users have tendency to be more deliberate with their choices in S2, as opposed to 
‘System 1 Thinking Mode’ (S1). S1 is more routine and not as deliberate or thoughtful 
(Kahneman, 2011). Warning is defined as “something that makes you understand there is 
a possible danger or problem, especially one in the future”, and the definition of alert as, 
“an alarm or other signal of danger” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2018, p. 30). Alerts 
and warnings can be used to trigger S2 (Kahneman, 2011). 
Alerts and warnings have been used for several common situations: fire alarms to 
alert of smoke, gas, or fire, weather alerts to signal imminent weather danger, and home 
intrusion alarms to signal unauthorized access. Alerts and warnings have been used with 
several manufacturers to warn drivers of danger in driving situations and have become 
universally adopted in all vehicles. Examples of some automotive related warnings and 
alerts include loud beeps, blinking lights or icons, and seat or steering wheel vibrations 
(Zheng et al., 2004) have been used to obtain a driver’s attention in order to prompt the 
driver to a potentially dangerous situation.  
Meaningful warning systems reflect specific urgency and prompt the user to pay 
attention based on the perception of the severity of the sound, visual prompt, and other 
system by the user (Sousa et al., 2016).  Specifically, audio alerting should be used when 




The balance between too many alerts, and what the user needs to pay attention to, can be 
differentiated by users based on audio, visual, and other techniques  (Sousa et al., 2016).  
It appears that developing ways to help users make decisions in S2 could be 
beneficial. Utilizing S2 could improve users’ ability to recognize, alert, and react 
appropriately to phishing attempts. Assisting users to switch to S2 could potentially help 
decrease the amount of individual identity theft, Business Email Compromise (BEC), and 
corporate data theft through risk of phishing in emails. Through the following literature 
synthesis, it appears little attention has been paid in research regarding audio, visual, and 
haptic (vibration) warnings in the context of cybersecurity, or more specifically in the 
context of alerting and warning users to signs of phishing in emails through 
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning combinations.  
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and empirically test 
the effectiveness (via the measures of (a) ability to notice, & (b) time to notice) of an 
audio, visual, and haptic warning system that alerts users to the signs of phishing in 
emails on mobile devices. The need for this work was demonstrated by Almomani et al. 
(2013), Acquisti (2016), and The Anti-Phishing Working Group (2018). An initial list of 
signs of phishing in emails, that are considered the most critical threats, was developed 
from published research, and preliminarily identified in the corresponding literature 
synthesis. Additionally, libraries of both audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings to 
correspond with each of the signs of phishing in emails were developed to use towards 




The first specific goal of this study was to develop and validate, using Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs), the list of the top signs of phishing in emails that are considered 
the most critical threats. Frauenstein (2019) indicated that there are certain signs of 
phishing in emails that should be more commonly seen by users currently, as well as 
certain signs of phishing in emails that are considered more dangerous than others (based 
on a high percentage of automated security controls in place to ward off commonly seen 
risks). Outcome from the first goal was used to determine the SMEs’ identified and 
validated list of the top signs of phishing in emails that are the most critical threats, in 
rank order, paired with an audio/visual/haptic alert and warning for the second goal.  
Anderson et al. (2013) indicated that polymorphic warnings (beeps, sounds, & 
vibrations) can reduce habituation. Axon et al. (2017) indicated that audio warnings are 
more effective when appropriately designed for the human ear, pertaining to 
cybersecurity warnings. Appropriately matched audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings 
for the related signs of phishing in emails is important to examine. 
The third and fourth specific goals of this study was to determine the tasks for 
measures of (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails using 
SMEs. The SMEs validated measures helped to determine if improvement was made with 
or without the assistance of PAWS for the user. The measure of ability to notice is 
referred to an individual user’s ability (or lack thereof) to notice if an email has signs of 
phishing. The measure of time to notice is referred to the time (in seconds) of an 
individual user’s ability to determine if an email has signs of phishing.  
The fifth goal of this research was to determine validation and testing procedures 




prototype. The development of valid components of the phishing alert and warning 
system utilized SME validated feedback for (a) top signs of phishing in emails in rank 
order, (b) SME validated feedback for audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings to pair 
with the signs of phishing, (c) characteristics to assess users’ ability to notice and/or time 
to notice signs of phishing in emails, (d) based on SMEs’ response, the measure of time 
to notice will determine how long (in seconds) users ‘notice signs of phishing in emails. 
This research goal included the actual programing and building of the PAWS mobile app 
prototype. Testing procedures included capturing the qualitative feedback of prototype 
testers, and correcting any significant issues with the mobile app.  
The sixth goal of this study was to determine if there are any significant mean 
differences among the users’ ability to notice, time to notice, and time to notice signs of 
phishing in emails with or without PAWS. The seventh goal of this research study was  to 
determine if there are any significant mean differences among the users’ ability to notice, 
time to notice, and time to notice signs of phishing in emails based on (a) age, (b) gender, 
(c) experience with phishing training, and (d) attention span. 
Ability to notice that an email has signs of phishing, or poses a significant risk, is 
critical to user’s cybersecurity situational awareness (Wash & Cooper, 2018). As 
practiced in other fields, such as automotive, audio/visual/haptic warnings are used for 
alerting such as fasten seatbelt, lane departure, loss of air pressure, and engine trouble 
(Sternlund et al., 2017). The hypothesis is that a user’s time to notice the signs of 
phishing in emails may improve if measured first without the use of audio/visual/haptic 
warnings, then again with the use of audio/visual/haptic warnings to determine if the user 




audio/visual/haptic warnings, while also attempting to see if any significant differences 
exist base on key demographics indictors as well as audio/visual/haptic alert and warning 
combinations.  
Sheng et al. (2010) indicated the importance of demographic research in the 
context of studying and training specific user groups against risk behavior and phishing 
susceptibility. The PAWS Mobile App was configured to determine if there are any mean 
differences in the users’ ability to notice, time to notice, and time to notice signs of 
phishing in emails using PAWS based on (a) age, (b) gender, (c) experience with 
phishing training, as well as (d) attention span. In summary, PAWS was developed using 
SME feedback and used to determine if audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings improve a 
user’s ability to notice the top signs of phishing in emails more quickly, thus, reducing 
phishing susceptibility.  
Research Questions 
The main Research Question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What 
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system combination can be used to empirically 
assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to notice phishing in emails on mobile 
devices?  
RQ1: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of phishing in emails that are 
considered the most critical threats to users? 
RQ2: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings are most 
valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails?   
RQ3: What are the SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to 




RQ4: What is the SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice 
signs of phishing in emails? 
RQ5: What validation and testing procedures should be considered to deliver a 
mobile app phishing alert and warning prototype? 
RQ6a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS?  
RQ6b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS? 
RQ6c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS? 
RQ7a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) 
gender, (c) experience with phishing training, and (d) attention span? 
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to 
notice of phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) 
experience with phishing training, as well as (d) attention span? 
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) 
gender, (c) experience with phishing training, as well as (d) attention span? 
Relevance and Significance 
Relevance 
 The relevance of this research study is that it presented a novel way of alerting 
users to signs of phishing in emails on mobile devices using audio/visual/haptic 




Users are still susceptible to phishing attacks delivered through email (Anti-Phishing 
Working Group, 2018). Phishing continues to be a viable social engineering method, and 
collectively costs users and businesses millions of dollars on an annual basis 
(Frauenstein, 2019). Phishing, spear phishing, and other social engineering techniques are 
being used against users on a regular basis (Almomani et al., 2013; Carlton & Levy, 
2017). Phishing attacks target more than 37.3 million people per year (Real, 2013), and 
costs organizations an average of $3.7 million annually (Wombat Security, 2015). This 
figure includes loss of user productivity, cost of containing malware exploited by the 
phishing attack, and cost to remediate loss of personal credentials. Phishing is also a 
corporate and personal data theft issue as noted by Nelson (2016). According to Acquisti 
et al. (2010), users are clicking on phishing links and need improved ways to alert users 
to not fall for phishing in emails. Alerting users to notice signs of phishing in emails by 
utilizing S2 triggers such as audio/visual/haptic alerting would directly add to the body of 
research aimed at assisting users to be less susceptible to phishing attack.  
Significance 
This study contributes to the significant area of phishing prevention social 
engineering mitigation by increasing user phishing awareness through alerts and 
warnings (Abass, 2018; Hong, 2016; Mouton et al., 2016). Zadelhoff (2016) indicated 
that users are the biggest threat to an organization. Human behavior, while parsing 
emails, is also a factor in user determination of whether an email is a phishing email 
containing a malicious link, or a safe email (Pattinson et al., 2012).  
Myounghoon et al. (2015) determined auditory cues assist with dual task 




dual task performance and causes individuals to be distracted (Kahneman, 2011; Mansi & 
Levy, 2013). This information, combined with the research by Kahneman (2011), 
indicate S2 could be triggered with auditory, visual, and haptic cues to alert a user of risk-
taking behaviors. Some ways to trigger S2 include audio alerts, visual alerts, text and 
screen movement, text presented in a secondary language, and text presented in reverse. 
Assisting the user in noticing signs of phishing in emails could possibly be studied 
through the delivery of audio/visual/haptic alerts, thus, triggering S2. Vance et al. (2014) 
studied security risk taking behaviors and effectiveness of security warnings. Their 
research determined polymorphic warnings decrease habituation. Providing additional 
research towards audio/visual/haptic alerting for signs of phishing in emails could build 
upon previous research to help combat the problem of users clicking on phishing links. 
This could result in less data loss, significant costs associated with data recovery, and 
costs of information security efforts. 
Barriers and Issues 
 This research study had several potential barriers and issues that were addressed. 
One challenge was developing a SME survey containing as many elements of the PAWS 
prototype as possible. A separate companion document was added to the survey to play 
audio samples and visual icons for the SMEs to choose from. One barrier was collecting 
SME responses and feedback in a two-week time period. This time factor had potential to 
disrupt the research study timeline SME participants were rewarded with gift cards to 
help mitigate this risk. Participants for the PAWS mobile application were recruited 
through LinkedIn contacts of the primary investigator, a potential barrier was participants 




the researcher was added to the recruitment email to be available for questions and 
comments about the mobile app. Another potential barrier was participants not 
understanding the mobile app email screens or functionality of the mobile alert and 
warning application. Contact information of the researcher was utilized in the few cases 
users had issues with the mobile app itself.  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
 It was assumed that SMEs understood the survey and answered appropriately. It 
was also assumed that PAWS participants will be readily available and willing to 
participate in the study. Another assumption of this study was that participants were able 
to operate their mobile device, that they regularly utilize sound and vibration on their 
mobile phone, and that the simulated emails represented in the PAWS mobile application 
were understandable and relatable for the study participants.  
Limitations 
 A limitation of this study included unexpected events that limited the availability 
of participants. A limitation of this study was that PAWS was designed to best represent 
examples of phishing email messages to the participants of the study. If the examples of 
phishing emails are deemed incorrect, or irrelevant to the user, the study was not 
effective. If the data input “is either incorrect, of low quality, or irrelevant, the resulted 
output is going to be ineffective regardless of the quality of the processing, colloquially, 
garbage-in/garbage-out” (Levy & Ellis, 2006, p. 185). Other potential limitation 




and visual icons not being relevant or understandable by the participant, and urgency 
level of the audio not matching the urgency understanding of the participant.  
Financial limitations included inability to program a hover over links in email originating 
from the participants email. This feature was limited to a picture, or screen of an email 
with limited functionality.  
Delimitations 
 A potential delimitation of this proposed study was choosing vague simulated 
phishing messages. As a validation of emails chosen, extensive literature review, and re-
creation of emails were performed. Another delamination included audio/visual/haptic 
warnings potentially not representing the urgency needed to spark the user’s attention. As 
a validation of audio/visual/haptic warnings used in the prototype, SMEs were asked to 
pair warnings with their perceived urgency of the simulated emails. 
Definition of Terms 
 The following represent terms and definitions. 
Alert –An alarm or other signal of danger (p. 30). (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2018). 
 
Cybersecurity – “A computing-based discipline involving technology, people, 
information, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of adversaries. It 
draws from the foundational fields of information security and information assurance; 
and began with more narrowly focused field of computer security” (Joint Task Force on 
Cybersecurity Education, 2017, p. 16). 
Haptics – “The science of touch. Use of technology promoted by interacting with 




Phishing – “Phishing is a form of social engineering in which an attacker attempts to 
fraudulently acquire sensitive information from a victim by impersonating a trustworthy 
third party” (Jagatic, 2007, p. 1). 
System 2 Thinking – “Understanding a more aware state of mind in human behavior and 
response” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 13).  
Tactile cues – “Perceptible by touch: textures, vibrations, and bumps” (Chang, 2002, p. 
84). 
Vulnerability – “Human, organizational, and technical weaknesses that can be exploited 
by an adversary” (Canfield, 2018, p. 827). 
Warning – “Something that makes one understand there is a possible danger or problem, 
especially one in the future” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2018, p. 390). 
Summary 
 Social engineering and phishing are still problems that needs to be properly 
mitigated and further included in the body of research that aims at reducing phishing 
susceptibility among users. This research contributes toward phishing susceptibility 
improvements among users by developing a prototype that alerted users to the signs of 
phishing in emails with audio/visual/haptic alerting. SMEs opinion was gathered towards 
validation of the most important signs of phishing users should be warned about. This 
step included collecting SME opinion via survey to rank simulated phishing examples. 
SMEs feedback was also used to pair alerts and warnings with emails. SMEs feedback 
was also used to determine which set of audio/visual/haptic alerting should be paired with 











 According to Krumholtz et al. (2015), social engineering can be defined as 
manipulating users into providing sensitive information to an untrustworthy source. 
Social engineering is also defined as one way to gain sensitive information about an 
email recipient by taking advantage of human behavior (Abass, 2018). The sensitive 
information obtained can consist of passwords, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, 
social security number, and other identifiers that could be used to open or gain access to a 
variety of financial, network, and social accounts (Krumbolz et al., 2015). According to 
Hong (2012), phishing attacks are also used to steal personal information, credit card 
information, intellectual property, corporate information, and national security secrets.  
People are easily hacked by luring them to click on harmful links that lead to fake 
websites with malware, downloading software, and running malicious applications 
(Krumbolz et al., 2015). Deceiving the user into giving personal information can lead to 
compromise of accounts (Abass, 2018). Social engineering preys on the innate human 
tendency to trust and/or help others (Mouton et al., 2016). Depending on the level of 
access the user has, this can lead to business compromise, as well as personal account 
compromise. This research will focus on the social engineering channel of phishing, and 
the signs of phishing in emails.  
Motivators for attackers include money and information. According to Hong 




or indirectly by the victim. In some cases, account credentials can be stolen through a few 
different social engineering channels. For example, an attacker could lure people to a 
website created to appear as a legitimate site and ask for the victims to enter their 
username and password (Hong, 2012). Through this method, the attackers can harvest 
several username and password combinations in attempt access to bank accounts or other 
private accounts. Sometimes the account information is sold online in underground 
networks where the access information is sold to others (Hong, 2012). 
 Social engineering attacks include and combine physical, social, and technical 
aspects to achieve the goal of deceiving the user (Krumbolz et al., 2015). According to 
Phishing.org (2019), social media can be exploited in many ways, including Facebook 
Messenger. In this attack, Facebook users receive messages from someone already 
familiar with them. This spoofed or impersonated person sends a message to the 
Facebook user redirecting them to a spoofed page asking for log in credentials (Phishing 
Examples, 2019). Many channels and attack vectors can be used in combination to gain 
access to user accounts, and user networks through social engineering. Social engineering 
channels include instant messaging, telephone, social network applications, cloud 
services for corporations, multiplayer games, and websites (Hong, 2012; Kromboltz et 
al., 2015). Fraudulent or phishing websites are also a common way to trick a user into 
entering personal data. Some clues to fraudulent websites include spoofed content (the 
web site was crafted to appear as a legitimate website) incorrect address bar URL, status 
bar errors and overall security indicators (Dhamija et al., 2006). 
Email phishing is the most common social engineering method (Hong, 2012). An 




information to the attacker. Phishing with email can also be used to direct a user to a fake 
website and then have the user enter personal information into the fake website. Phishing 
usually involves three phases (Hong, 2012). During the first phase, the victim usually 
receives an email with one, or many signs of phishing in the email. The next phase 
usually includes the victim either taking action by entering information as prompted by 
the attacker, or other action suggested in the message usually resulting in the victim 
giving the attacker the desired information. The final phase is monetizing the stolen 
information in the form of selling the account information or by actually logging in as the 
user and stealing money from an account or stealing the desired intellectual property or 
secrets (Hong, 2012). 
Hong (2012) concluded that the phishing is a problem that most likely will never 
be solved. Hong (2012) suggested to address the worst aspects of phishing and work on 
improving ways to prevent, attack, and respond to phishing attacks. Abass (2108) 
determined the most effective defense to social engineering is to educate and assist users 
in noticing signs of social engineering. This proposed research study aims at preventing 
or at least mitigating the threat of phishing attacks by alerting users to the signs of 
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Signs of Phishing in Emails 
 There are several signs of phishing in emails (Wash & Cooper, 2018). Most 
frequently, phishing emails will include more than one sign of phishing. Signs of 
phishing in emails researched through a literature synthesis include but are not limited to: 
sense of urgency, requiring action, monetary gain, misspelling and grammar issues, 
greeting errors, signature errors, incorrect URL, request to click on links, request for 
information, spoofed sender or content, unsolicited or unexpected attachments, address 
mismatch, threatening language, and highly personalized emails (Chandrasekaran et al., 
2006; “Phishing Examples,” 2018; “Phishing Examples- What’s the risk, and how to 
identify and deal with them”, 2019;  Sheng et al., 2010; “The anatomy of a phishing 
email,” 2019; Wash & Cooper, 2018; Yates & Harris, 2015). 
Urgency 
Urgency is a main sign of phishing in emails. Hong (2012) indicated that urgency 
is a method for criminals to misdirect attention. They also described an urgency email as 
sending an email to an email recipient warning people of an attack and instilling a sense 
of urgency that a patch must be installed immediately. Urgency can also be used to 
attempt to invoke an impulse emergency response from the recipient (Chandrasekaran et 
al., 2006). Unusual log-in activity is another example of a tech-based urgency email that 
requires an action from the user for an account to not be closed. Another example of 
urgency would be notifying users of several failed logins to their account, instilling 
urgency by insisting the user verifies their account immediately to avoid account deletion 
(Sheng et al., 2010). Urgency can be presented in several ways. One example as 




account is not closed (Wash & Cooper, 2018). For the purpose of this research, urgency 
will be portrayed as both technical (including loss of corporate email account, loss of 
personal account connectivity, and corporate account access) and personal (including 
immediate need to verify shipping address to a personal resistance and personal bank 
account issues). 
Figure 1 
Sign of Phishing in Email: Sense of Urgency  
 
Requiring Action from the Recipient 
Requiring action from the email recipient is a sign of phishing in emails that plays 
upon urgency and the user’s accounts or activities (“Phishing Examples - What’s the risk, 
how to identify them and deal with them”, 2019). Figure 2 illustrates the need for action 
from the recipient. The email appears to be from a shipper sending something to the 




include asking the recipient to review personal details for a specified account. Other 
examples are phishing emails that ask the recipient to upgrade their account or to reset 
their password. Phishing emails requiring action can also include unsolicited emails about 
accounts the user does not have. Most businesses have policies that specify personal 
information will not be requested through email, which should be an indication the email 
is a phishing attempt.  
Figure 2 
Sign of Phishing in Email: Requiring Action  
 
Monetary Gain for The Recipient 
Monetary gain is also a sign of phishing in emails. Hong (2012) described filling 
out a survey in exchange for a cash award. Cash reward is promised as a result from 
action from the participant. This sign of phishing is usually accompanied by a request for 




The famous Nigerian Prince scam, or the Nigerian 419 scams are an example of 
monetary gain as a sign of phishing in emails. The scam offers free money in exchange 
for helping the attacker send large amounts of money. This style of attack has migrated to 
social media platforms as spoofed accounts appearing to be accounts of the victim’s 
friends asking for money or donations, as illustrated in Figure 3. The Nigerian prince 
scam is still alive and well today through the social engineering channel of email (“What 
motivates people to click: Phishing examples and techniques used”, 2018). 
Figure 3 
Sign of Phishing in Email: Monetary Gain 
 
Misspelling and Grammar Issues 
Misspelling and grammar errors in emails can be another sign of phishing in 
emails as shown in Figure 4. Incorrect use of words, fragmented sentences, improper 




Grammar errors are common in phishing emails crafted for recipients that are not in the 
senders’ primary language spoken or are usually due to rushing to send out the emails. 
With spellcheck and other grammar assistants with word processors, this sign of phishing 
should be easily spotted (“Phishing Emails”, 2018). Misspelling of a spoofed account can 
also be common for example of phishing (Hong, 2012). Punctuation errors as well as odd 
or incorrect spacing may also fall under this category. Homographs may also be present 
in grammatical errors. Homographs are words with the same spelling but different 
meaning. These are usually used to persuade the recipient to click on a link (“Phishing 
Emails” 2018).  
Figure 4 








Greeting errors such as impersonal greeting, formal greeting, or unexpected 
greeting, are another sign of phishing in emails as shown in Figure 5. If the recipient is 
normally addressed from the sender with “Hi”, the recipient does not expect to see “Hey” 
from the sender. Sirull (2019) described other examples of this sign of phishing in emails 
as addressing the recipient in a formal way with “Dear Sir or Madam”. Another example 
is addressing the recipient as “Dear User” or “Valued Customer”, (Hacquebord, 2017). 
Figure 5 illustrates an incorrect greeting error of “hey you” from a sender that would not 
address the customer in that way.  
Figure 5 








Signature errors such as Incorrect/Unexpected Signature include missing 
information that should be contained in the signature such as phone number, address, title 
and additional contact information (Hegde, 2019; Sirull, 2019). Missing this type of 
contact information, especially for emails requesting or promising financial implications 
can be a red flag for suspicion when identifying signs of phishing in emails, as illustrated 
in Figure 6. Additionally, a sender including their email address in the signature block 
could also be a signature error.  
Figure 6 
Sign of Phishing in Email: Signature Errors  
 
Incorrect URL 
Incorrect URL encompass issues with the URL continued in the email. In some 




common and a sign of phishing in an email (Hale et al., 2015). Hovering over URL’s will 
allow the recipient to examine the text of the URL. Some signs of phishing include link 
masks, shortened URL’s, incorrect email address from the sender, and hyperlinks leading 
to a different URL than what is expected, as shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 
Sign of Phishing in Email: Incorrect URL  
 
Requesting the Recipient to Click on Links 
Request to click on links are a sign of phishing in emails that is sometimes 
characterized by asking the user to “Please click on the following link”. 
Misleading links can be masked as a legitimate site (Vishwanath et al., 2018). Yates and 
Harris (2015) indicated links should be typed, not copied, to the browser when requested 




Figure 8. In this example, the recipient is asked to click on a link to accept new terms and 
conditions (“Phishing Scam”, 2017). 
Figure 8 
Sign of Phishing in Email: Request to Click on Links  
 
Request for Information from the Recipient 
 Requests for information from the recipient is also a sign of phishing in email 
(Hale et al., 2015). Phishing attempts will ask the recipient for password information, 
username used on websites, personal information, health information, and payment card 
data. Sirull (2019) indicated the sender should already have the information being 
requested from the recipient. An example of this sign of phishing is shown in Figure 9. In 
this example the recipient is directed to click on a link and then enter personal 






Sign of Phishing in Email: Request for Information  
 
Spoofed Content or Spoofed Sender 
Spoofed content and Spoofed sender are a common sign of phishing in emails. 
Emails such as the one shown in Figure 10, appear to be from coworkers, family, or even 
businesses the recipient has accounts with such as Paypal, Bank of America, or other 
accounts (Caputo et al., 2014). The emails may also appear to come from the recipient’s 
manager or boss. Another spoofed sender would be the CEO or other executive from the 









Sign of Phishing in Email: Spoofed Sender or Content 
 
Unsolicited or Unexpected Attachments 
Unsolicited or Unexpected Attachments can also be a sign of phishing in emails. 
Opening an attachment can sometimes infect the recipient’s device with virus or spyware 
(Wyro, 2019). This sign of phishing in emails asks the recipient to open attachments that 
the recipient did not ask for, or expect (Sirull, 2019). Email containing this sign of 










Sign of Phishing in Email: Unsolicited Attachment  
 
Threatening Language 
Threatening language can be a sign of phishing in emails presented in several 
forms. Some emails such as this can be a result of a previous phishing attempt resulting 
in a ransomware attempt towards the recipient (Abrams, 2018). Some threatening 
language emails contain a “do this now, or you will pay” tone to the message. A 










Sign of Phishing in Email: Threatening Language 
 
Email Address Mismatch 
Molinaro and Bolton (2017) indicated address mismatch is a common sign of 
phishing in emails where the from address does not match the reply address as illustrated 












Sign of Phishing in Email: Sender Address Mismatch  
 
Highly Personalized Emails 
Highly personalized emails can indicate the sender has studied the recipient 
through social media or search techniques (“Phishing Emails – What’s the risk, how to 
identify them and deal with them”, 2019), which can be difficult to determine if an 
attacker has studied the victim extremely well. Some examples of this sign of phishing in 
emails include specific information social engineers can obtain from social medial sites to 
craft an email that will grab the recipient’s attention (Corsica Technologies, 2018). Figure 








Sign of Phishing in Email: Highly Personalized 
 
 Many examples of recent phishing attempts exist online or in literature. As 
previously discussed, several signs of phishing in emails can be combined into one email 
to increase the chances of tricking the recipient. For purposes of this study, one “main” 
sign of phishing in email will be used for each example to obtain SMEs ranking 
preferences for the top signs of phishing in emails. As illustrated through Figures 2-15, 
many signs of phishing exist today and are still tricking recipients into clicking links, 
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User Phishing Training 
 User training towards noticing the signs of phishing in email is considered a first 
line of defense against social engineering and phishing attacks (NIST, 2018). Some 
methods of user training include web-based videos, flyers and handouts, embedded 
training, and realistic phishing tests (Miranda, 2018). Miranda (2018) indicated training 
users on phishing detection and incident response are important in setting up a successful 
corporate phishing training system. Foundational research by Dhamija et al. (2006) 





 Several approaches to end-user phishing training have been used to better train 
end-users to the dangers of social engineering and phishing. Foundational research in this 
area include Kumaraguru et al. (2009) who tested an embedded anti-phishing training 
system, PhishGuru with 515 participants. PhishGuru trained participants to recognize 
signs of phishing in email by delivering training messages after the user clicked URL 
links in the phishing email (Kumaraguru, 2009). The training was delivered several times 
over a 35-day period. Their results concluded that users with anti-phishing training 
appear to be less vulnerable to phishing attempts against them as compared to 
participants that did not receive anti-phishing training. On the other hand, Caputo et al. 
(2014) determined embedded training did not reduce click rates on phishing emails. They 
also suggested repetitive phishing training might yield better results over short-term 
training.  
Several styles of phishing training have been researched. Wash and Cooper 
(2018) studied a phishing training method utilizing immediate feedback training from 
simulated peers or experts. Facts-and-advice training was similar to common phishing 
training today from experts, or rule-based training. “Stores” was a training style crafted to 
appear to tell a story about a phishing experience. Simulated phishing messages were 
presented to the user, and training was delivered if the user clicked on a simulated 
phishing link. Facts-and-advice style training led to lower click rates when appearing to 
come from an expert, while stories-based training appeared to have a lower click rate 
when appearing to come from a peer (Wash & Cooper, 2018). Jensen et al. (2017), also 




mindfulness training over a multi-day time period. Their study concluded that 
mindfulness techniques show promise as a phishing training method.  
Gamification strategies, such as Anti-Phishing Phil (Sheng et al., 2007) uses an 
interactive approach to training users to notice signs of phishing websites. Their research 
concluded that gamification interaction can be an effective way to train users to notice 
phishing signs (Sheng et al., 2007). Hale et al. (2014) began developing an anti-phishing 
game that encompasses email simulation, email inbox simulation, web browser 
simulation, and social medial simulation. Several end-user training strategies exist in 
literature. Contributions to the area of research include recognizing when a user cannot 
distinguish between a legitimate website and a spoofed website or email, and that anti-
phishing training participants are less likely to click on real phishing messages than those 
that do not.    
Table 3 
Summary of Phishing End-User Training Literature 






































Summary of Phishing End-User Training Literature –(continued) 
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Summary of Phishing End-User Training Literature – (continued) 
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Phishing Email Filtering Tools and Warning Systems 
 There are several email filtering solutions available today as a way to warn users 
of signs of phishing in emails. Most warnings are visual popup windows and/or buttons 
to click to report phishing emails to administration. There are also several appliance-
based products that filter email on the corporate email server, and “learn” signs of 
phishing in email either warn the user, or block the phishing URL (Dublin, 2018).  
 Google attempts to warn users of suspicious emails in Gmail by utilizing visual 
alert banner messages that appear at the top of suspicious emails (“Can Gmail Detect 
Phishing Scams?” 2019). Microsoft Office 365 includes anti-phishing protection and 
warns users with visual alert messages and reporting buttons (Palarchio, 2016). 
Proofpoint is an integrated security application. Their anti-phishing solution utilized 
PhishAlarm, a tool that filters email and visually alerts the user to a sign of phishing 
email as a secondary image appears on the email screen (“PhishAlarm and PhishAlarm 




protection. Their product will pop up a visual warning to users if the URL is incorrect 
(“Anti-Fraud and Anti-Phishing Protection”, 2019). 
Phishing Susceptibility and Demographics 
Research has been performed in the area of demographics and the relationship to 
users being susceptible to phishing attempts against them. The results of this research are 
important as it helps researchers understand if there is a specific demographic that is 
more susceptible to phishing than others, and most likely needs either additional or more 
specific training to assist the user in noticing signs of phishing. According to Darwish et 
al. (2012), understanding user demographics and backgrounds can help improve security 
awareness efforts and reduce phishing susceptibility.  
 Age, gender, education, and personality are a few demographics to consider 
towards predicting user’s susceptibility. Age appears to be a strong predictor in user 
susceptibility towards phishing attacks. Kumaraguru et al. (2009) found that participants 
in the 18-25 age group were most susceptible to phishing attacks during a study of their 
PhishGuru training system. During earlier work in 2007, Kumaraguru et al. (2007) tested 
an online gamification training system, Anti-Phishing Phil - discovering the age group of 
18 and younger were more susceptible than older age groups. Sheng et al. (2010) 
conducted an online case study and survey indicating the age group 18-25 are more 
susceptible to phishing.  
Gender has also been studied as a data point towards demographic analysis 
towards phishing susceptibility. Several studies have concluded that women are more 
susceptible than men (Jegatic et al., 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Olivera, 2017; Sheng 




significant correlation between participants gender, age, education or race in relation to 
phishing susceptibility. Education and training for users has been determined to be an 
important data point towards the ability to notice signs of phishing in emails and was 
covered in a previous section of this literature synthesis. More research in this specific 
area could benefit the field of demographics as it relates to phishing attempts, and thus, 
reduce the gap in literature.  
Table 4 
Phishing Susceptibility and Demographics Literature 
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Phishing Susceptibility and Demographics Literature – (continued) 
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Audio/Visual/Haptic Alerts and Warnings    
 Audio beeps, visual alerts, icons, and vibrations (haptic warnings) are used in 
several consumer areas today to alert and warn users of potential issues or emergency. 
Seatbelt warning systems are arguably the most recognizable automobile warning system. 
According to Lohr (1974), many individuals were reluctant to use seatbelts in 
automobiles. Adding an audible sound to remind the driver and passengers to buckle up 
was used as an alert or warning. A 2007 Department of Transportation study determined 
enhances seat belt reminder systems utilizing sound, icon, and text increased front 
occupant seat belt use.  
 Additionally, rear-end collision systems are also in place, and being researched 




driver to potential issues. Scott and Gray (2008) determined there is promise in the area 
of using tactile methods to draw attention to hazards for the driver. Blind spot warnings 
such as a blinking light shown in the rearview mirror can also alert the driver of a car in 
their blind spot (“Should Your New Car Have Blind Spot Monitoring”, 2019). 
 Several visual icons exist today for warning drivers of issues with the car or 
driving conditions (Greene, 2016). Dashboard icons alert the driver of engine issues, car 
running on auxiliary power or battery, slippery conditions or traction system, high 
temperature, gas tank low, and fasten seatbelt. There is also significant research dedicated 
to audio sounds and alerts played inside of vehicles (Krisher, 2016). According to Krisher 
(2016), the average car has 10-15 different sounds played for various alerts and warnings. 
Alerts and warnings are tested on drivers in research studies to determine if the sound is 
effective as a warning, or if the sound is distracting (Kirsher, 2016). 
 Jensen et al. (2011) concluded through a simulated driving experiment on 25 
participants that steering wheel vibrations (or haptic feedback) provided an overall 
improvement in driver safety using steering wheel haptic feedback to avoid hitting 
obstacles. Vibrations can happen at increased intensity to alert the driver of increasingly 
urgent situations (Jensen et al., 2011). Vibrating seats are another use of haptic warnings 
for drivers. Steering wheel and seat vibrations are used by several automotive 
manufacturers today to warn drivers of potential danger such as lane departures and road 
hazards (Kane, 2012). Research by van der Heiden et al. (2016) discovered that 
audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings should be given in a timely manner. Their study 




change departures but must be given at least 500m before potential collision (van der 
Hidden et al., 2016).  
Collision warning systems for vehicles using audio/visual/haptic factors are also 
incorporated into modern vehicles (Kane, 2012). Systems can be configured to minimize 
nuisance factors of the alarms (Ernst & Wilson, 2002). According to Ernst and Wilson 
(2002), Collision warning systems reduce collisions by warning and alerting the driver of 
potential hazards (ACAS Program Final Report, 1998).  
Other areas consumers benefit from audio/visual/haptic alerting are medical alarm 
systems for patients. Audio beeps, visual flashing icons, and alarm sounds alert to get the 
attention of medical personnel if a patient is having difficulty or in danger (“Continuous 
Wireless Pressure Monitoring and Mapping with Ultra-Small Passive Sensors for Health 
Monitoring and Critical Care”, 2019). Urgency is represented by color of visual 
information and specific urgent frequencies. Weather warnings also convey urgency by 
specific colors used and specific alarm warnings (Event Alert System, 2019).  
Alerts and warnings containing audio/visual/haptic feedback for a user could 
reduce habituation to alerts and warnings but should be meaningfully interpreted by the 
user. This theory is derived from Kahneman (2011)’s theory of Thinking Fast and Slow 
related to the S2 thinking. Findling and Mayrhofer (2015) researched approaches to using 
haptic vibration as a feedback channel for consumers as it pertains to detecting if an 
electronic device is real or replaced by attackers. Participants were able to determine if 
the device was real by interpreting a vibration upon authenticating to the device. Hoggan 
et al. (2009) studied the meanings that can be conveyed through audio and haptic tactile 




urgency between a low phone battery warning, and a low heart rate warning (Hoggan et 
al., 2009). Hoggan et al. (2009) concluded that a thoughtful combination audio and tactile 
methods can be intuitively interpreted by the user. This finding stresses the importance of 
accurate representation of audio and tactile warnings that are suited properly for the 
urgency of the event. 
Table 5 
Alerts and Warnings in Literature 
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User Use of Smartphones  
Poushter and Stewart (2016) indicated that the volume of smartphone ownership 
and use has increased in Europe, the United States, and emerging economies around the 
world. Their research concluded that at least 89% of Americans own a smartphone 




reading email and determined an average of 67% of consumers use a smartphone to 
check their email. 
Most email is checked with a mobile device and then with a laptop/desktop 
(Nelson, 2017; van Rijn, 2019). Nelson (2017) stated that emails opened and viewed on a 
mobile device have doubled over the last five years. McLeod (2018) indicated that 
consumers now spend more than five hours a day on their smartphones.  
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in Literature 
It is known that most users are using smartphones and laptops to view and 
respond to emails daily (McLeod, 2018; van Rijn, 2019), and email phishing is the most 
common social engineering method (Hong, 2012). It is known that several signs of 
phishing in emails still exist today and continue to trick users into clicking links and 
divulge personal information to social engineers. Sense of urgency, requiring action from 
the recipient, promise of monetary gain, misspelling and grammar errors, greeting errors, 
signature errors, incorrect URL, requesting the recipient to click on links in the email, 
request for information from the recipient, spoofed content or sender, unsolicited or 
unexpected attachments in the email, threatening language, address mismatch, and highly 
personalized emails scams are continuing to lure users today.  
It is known phishing training does work to lower the percentage of click rates on 
signs of phishing among users, however, phishing attacks remain a problem today 
(Abass, 2018). Visual alerting systems such as: Phishing training, phishing reporting 
buttons, alerting dashboards, phishing alert tools, and phishing warning systems, are 
showing promise of assisting users in noticing signs of phishing in emails sooner, and 




considerable gap in phishing alerting is noticeable regarding audio and haptic feedback as 
an alerting and warning mechanism for identifying signs of phishing in emails.  
There is extreme importance placed on the ability for users to detect and respond 
to phishing attacks (Jensen et al., 2017). Anti-phishing training, yet effective, is not 
enough fully reduce phishing susceptibility. This research aims at improving ways to 
improve recognition time to signs of phishing in emails by alerting users to the signs of 
phishing in emails using audio/visual/haptic alerting on a smartphone and/or laptop. This 
study will also add to the body of knowledge surrounding demographics and phishing 
susceptibility, participant attention span, and the potential effect of phishing 
susceptibility.  
It is known that alerts and warnings assist people in noticing danger in several 
areas of daily life sooner than if alerts and warnings were not present. Automobiles and 
vehicle warning examples such as blind spot indicators, lane departure warnings, seatbelt 
not fasted warnings are consistently being researched and improved. Applying alerts and 
warnings from automobiles to emails containing signs of phishing in emails could add to 
the body of research attempting to alert users to email danger sooner. It is unknown how 
users would respond to a combination of audio, visual, and haptic alerting for signs of 
phishing in email delivered on smartphones and laptops. It is also unknown if habituation 
would be an issue with over-alerting users to the signs of phishing in emails. This 
research study would examine and test this research area. Thus, it appears a gap in the 
literature would be reduced by performing a phishing alerting and warning study utilizing 
audio/visual/haptic alerts on the signs of phishing in emails with participants. By 




research to the body demographic indicators in phishing could be used. The PAWS 
mobile application could then be used to effectively test user reaction time to signs of 








Chapter 3  
Methodology 
 
Overview of Research Design 
 This research study was conducted in three phases as shown in Figure 15. The 
development and testing of the PAWS mobile app prototype assisted users in noticing 
signs of phishing in emails through alerting and warning by audio/visual/haptic alerts. 
Also defined as a “thing”, the PAWS prototype addressed a problem, which is the 
foundation of developmental research (Ellis & Levy, 2009). Defined as sequential 
exploratory research by Creswell and Creswell (2017), this developmental research study 
empirically assessed participants’ results through both qualitative and quantitative data 
analysis that built into sequential phases of a qualitative step followed by a quantitative 
data analysis step. The methodological research design for this study included sequential 
exploratory research design (Creswell, 2017). According to Ivankova et al. (2006), 
sequential exploratory research design is a valid methodology for developmental 












Proposed Overview of the Research Design Process 
 
The first phase of this research study utilized initial qualitative data collection 
phrase using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) (Straub, 1989). The expert panel validated 




for each sign of phishing in email that (in the SMEs opinion) reflected the severity of the 
sign of phishing, and weighed in on an appropriate measures for ability to notice and time 
to notice phishing in emails by the users. The second phase of this research study 
encompassed the development and testing of PAWS. The third and final phase tested the 
effectiveness of audio, visual, and haptic alerting to the top signs of phishing in emails. 
This phases also included a qualitative and quantitative data collection with the PAWS 
mobile app participants (Straub, 1989).  
This research study resulted in developing a mobile application, PAWS, that was 
used to conduct the research and testing of the effectiveness of audio/visual/haptic alerts 
and warnings to assist in reducing phishing susceptibility. As previously stated, users 
need improved ways to notice signs of phishing in emails, thus, preventing significant 
data and financial losses. Users are continuously clicking on phishing links and need 
better ways to alert them to not fall for phishing emails (Abass, 2018). PAWS mobile 
application development and testing adds to the body of research in this area.  
Phase I 
 Utilizing the literature synthesis results in Chapter 2, a library of signs of phishing 
in email was developed into a list for the SMEs to rank the level of importance. Rank 
order and frequency analysis were used to determine what signs of phishing should be 
included in the PAWS mobile app. If all signs of phishing email screens include all alerts 
and warnings, or alert fatigue could result (Kesselheim, et al., 2011). Alert fatigue caused 
by excessive warnings could possibly be mitigated by highlighting the most important 
alerts and warnings (Kesselheim, et al., 2011). With user fatigue in mind, the top five 




The SMEs ranked what they felt the top signs of phishing in emails were. As 
indicated by Cooper (2014), narrowing down the top five (from 14 signs of phishing in 
email) are important as people summarize data in round ranking numbers as shown in 
Table 6. Isacc and Schindler (2014) described several top lists and indicated the 
importance of narrowing down “top” in categories. This listing and narrowing down of 
the top signs were utilized to reduce fatigue among PAWS mobile app participants. The 
initial survey instrument will be conducted using Survey Monkey, using Delphi 
methodology for expert feedback on this subject (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014), each SME 
received an email invitation to participate in the initial survey. Additional survey 
questions as well as the SME survey companion file examples are shown in Appendix A.  
Table 6 
SME Survey – List of Initial Signs of Phishing 
Sign of Phishing   Short Examples of Sign of Phishing 
Sense of urgency Unusual log in activity/failed log in attempts – click here 
to log in 
 
 Your account might be deleted 
 
 Mailbox is almost full 
 
Requiring action Click here to review details 
 
 Verify shipping address 
 
 Routine action – password reset 
 
 Update your account 
 
Monetary gain End user will receive a sum of money into their account if 
they help the sender 
 






SME Survey – List of Initial Signs of Phishing – (cont.) 
Sign of Phishing   Short Examples of Sign of Phishing 
 
Misspelling and grammar issues Incorrect tense 
 
 Misspelled body of text 
 
 Misspelled sender 
 
 Misspelled recipient 
 
Greeting errors Impersonal greeting – using “Hey” when the 
recipient expects “Hi”. 
 
 Unexpected greeting – when expecting to be 
addressed differently 
 
 Formal greeting – Dear Sir or Madam 
 
Signature errors Unexpected sign off – expecting Thank you, Mark  
 
 Missing signature content – does not contain 
phone number, address 
 
Incorrect URL Target does not match the link text 
 
 Misspelled url 
 
 Shortened url 
 
Request to click on links 
 
Please click the following link 
 
Request for information Need your password, username 
 
Spoofed sender or content Email appearing to be from your boss 
 
 Email appearing to be from your Friends list 
 
 Email appearing to be from your LinkedIn 
connections 
 






SME Survey – List of Initial Signs of Phishing – (cont.) 
Sign of Phishing   Short Examples of Sign of Phishing 
Unsolicited or unexpected 
attachments 
 
Email with a file the end user did not ask for 
Address mismatch  
 




You will have to pay X if you do not respond 
 
Highly Personalized Emails Spear phishing examples  
The survey also included a library of icons and sounds for the SMEs to pair with 
the signs of phishing in emails that they find to be most important. The survey included 
visual icons and audio to assign to the top signs of phishing. An example of visual icon 
matching examples are shown in Figure 16. An example of audio matching is shown in 
Figure 17. This feedback assisted in pairing a sign of phishing in email to an icon and 
sound of matching severity. An example of the haptic pairing survey question is shown in 
Figure 18. 
Figure 16 






Example of SME Survey – Choose Audio Sound Warning 
 
Figure 18 
Example of SME Survey – Choose Haptic Vibration Warning 
 
Also during this survey, the SMEs were asked their opinion on how long (in 




surveyed to include their opinion on characteristics of a user’s ability to notice a sign of 
phishing in email. This assisted in finding a benchmark time to notice and ability to 
notice based on expert opinion.   
Phase II 
 Phase II included the development of the PAWS mobile app prototype. SMEs 
feedback on the top signs of phishing in emails were paired with the SME feedback on 
audio, visual, and haptic signs that were used to alert the user of phishing. The SMEs 
characteristics of ability to notice and time to notice phishing in emails were included in 
the prototype design. A screen for participants to indicate what sign of phishing they saw 
was used after email screens when the participant clicked “Phishing” was added to the 
developmental design of PAWS. The data collected from this screen was analyzed to 
determine ability to notice signs of phishing in emails by the participants.  
Pilot testing of the prototype was conducted in this phase. Testing functionality of 
applications is an important part of application design (Rubin & Chisnell, 2008). The 
pilot testing included five participants and data was verified to ensure proper capture of 
all data points were considered and recorded. Observations, scoring, and manual 
measurements of time were conducted to ensure the assessment by the PAWS mobile app 
prototype is accurate.    
Phase III 
 Phase III encompassed the main research study with 205 participants. The 
participants answered a short demographic survey as shown in Appendix B. The 
participants then completed an attention span test as shown in Appendix C. The 




emails verified from Phase 1 as the top signs of phishing in emails. Alerts and warnings 
accompanied the simulated emails as decided by the SMEs in Phase 1. The research 
design process is illustrated in Figure 15.  
Instruments and Prototype Development 
Instrument for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in Emails 
 To identify SMEs feedback on the top signs of phishing in emails, a Survey 
Monkey survey was used. SurveyMonkey.com is a valid online survey and statistical 
analysis tool (Evans et al., 2009). Emails developed from literature were placed in a 
random order for the SMEs to rank. Survey Monkey’s data tools were used as data 
collection and correlation to determine frequency and final ranking.   
Instrument for SMEs Ranked Critical Threats, Paired with Unique A/V/H Alerts and 
Warnings 
 Included in the same survey for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in 
Emails, survey questions pertaining to SMEs opinion on preferred and ranked pair of 
audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings. Visual icons, audio sounds, and haptic vibration 
timing were presented for the SMEs to rank and pair.  
Instrument for SMEs Feedback on Ability to Notice, Time to Notice, and Ability to Notice 
Signs of Phishing in Emails 
Included in the same survey for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in 
Emails, survey questions pertaining to SMEs feedback on ability to notice, time to notice, 







Example of SMEs Survey – Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails 
 
Figure 20 







Instrument for SMEs Feedback on Validated Maximum Time to Notice Signs of Phishing 
in Emails 
Included in the same survey for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in 
Emails, a survey question pertaining to SMEs feedback on the maximum time to notice 
signs of phishing in emails was determined as shown in Figure 21.  
Figure 21 
Example of SMEs Survey – Max Time to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails 
 
Instrument for Participant Demographic Information 
Demographic questions for each participant were asked in the PAWS mobile 
application. Participants were assigned a unique number to ensure confidentiality of the 
participants. Qualifying questions were asked first in the demographic questions section. 
Each participant must be over the age of 18, have more than one email account, use a 
mobile device, and check email on their mobile device. Each participant ID was used to 




between the individual who participated, and the data was tracked to follow anonymity 
requirements and be consistent with IRB requirements. An example of the demographic 
questions are shown in Appendix B. Additionally, the PAWS post survey questions 
appeared after the PAWS test. The questions asked if the user noticed if their phone 
vibrated during the test, as well as if they heard any audible alerts. The questions were 
aimed at determining if participants normally utilize their mobile device audio and haptic 
response features and also determined if the participant is utilizing mobile device 
accessibility features if needed.  
Instrument for Participant Attention Span Information 
Attention span testing for participants was conducted as a similar test to 
Psychology Today’s Attention Span Test: 
(https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/tests/personality/attention-span-test) and was 
contained in the PAWS Mobile App. After each attention span test, answers were 
summed for an attention span score for each participant. Participants were asked a six 
attention span questions. Answers were ranked on a five-point scale with values of: five 
for ‘quite often’, four for ‘often’, three for ‘sometimes’, two for ‘rarely’, and one point 
for ‘almost never’. Participants were assigned a unique number to ensure confidentiality 
of the participants. Each number was used to uniquely identify participants and PAWS 
Mobile App data collection, however, no direct relationship between the individual who 
participated, and the data will be tracked to follow anonymity requirement and be 
consistent with IRB requirements. An example of the PAWS attention span test is shown 





PAWS Prototype Development 
 After gathering SMEs responses in Phase 1, The PAWS Mobile App was 
developed as a mobile app for both Google Play Store and Apple App Store for the 
application to be downloaded on participant’s mobile devices. Developmental design was 
utilized encompassing minimum requirements of the application as follows:  
1. Application was a hard-coded screen delivery/slideshow format of simulated 
phishing emails. Participant email accounts were not used. 
a. Simulated emails by SMEs ranking of the top signs of phishing in emails 
with pairings of audio/visual/haptic warnings 
2. Application was able to record user clicks and time in seconds for clicking 
legitimate or phishing for each email. 
a. To measure ability to notice signs of phishing in emails 
b. To measure time to notice phishing in emails per participant  
3. Application displayed a “what sign did you notice” screen for participants to click 
the sign of phishing they saw in the email 
a. To measure ability to notice signs of phishing in emails 
4. Application was able to vibrate or shake the device for specific simulated 
phishing emails 
a. Based on SMEs feedback, haptic vibrations were applied 
5. Development of simulated phishing slides included: 
a. Simulated phishing email slides without signs of phishing  
b. Simulated phishing emails examples from published sources 





The PAWS mobile app prototype was delivered to the participants in two process 
flows, totaling four experiment groups. Process 1, as shown on Figure 22, included the top 
five signs of phishing presented as simulated phishing emails to the study participants 
without audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings. This group (Group 1) did not contain 
audio, visual, or haptic alerting. Each simulated email was presented with a Legitimate and 
Phishing button at the bottom of the screen.  
The elapsed time for each participant to click Legitimate or Phishing while viewing 
each simulated email screen was recorded. The elapsed time it took the participant to click 
was compared to the SMEs baseline time of 25 seconds and determined if the click time is 
considered acceptable. After clicking Legitimate or Phishing, a screen appeared asking the 
participant what signs of phishing they noticed on the previous screen. The screen also 
included an “I don’t know, it just looked like phishing”. All choices the users clicked were 




















Process two, as shown on Figure 23 included randomized audio/visual/haptic 
warnings as determined from SMEs’ ranking of the top signs of phishing in emails, and 
audio/visual/haptic pairings from Phase I of this study. This process included Group 2, 
audio warnings and visual alerts (AV). Group 3, haptic alerts (H), and Group 4, audio, 
visual, and haptic alerts and warnings (AVH). Each simulated email was presented with a 
Legitimate and Phishing button at the bottom of the screen.  
The elapsed time for each participant to click Legitimate or Phishing while viewing 
each simulated email screen was recorded. The elapsed time it took the participant to 
click was compared to the SMEs baseline time of 25 seconds and determined if the click 
time is considered acceptable. After clicking Legitimate or Phishing, a screen appeared 
asking the participant what signs of phishing they noticed on the previous screen. The 
screen also included an “I don’t know, it just looked like phishing”. All choices the users 




















     Randomization of simulated email screens, as well as user fatigue of email viewing 
was addressed in several ways for phase II. For each sign of phishing, four simulated 
emails examples were designed, utilizing literature review to validate signs of phishing 
contained in the email example. All designs were of varying length and randomized per 
experiment group as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 













1 Sense of 
Urgency 
UrgencyShort Urgency1 UrgencyMed UrgencyLong 
2 Requiring 
Action 
ActionLong ActionShort Action1 ActionMed 
3 Request for 
Information 





Spelling1 SpellingMed SpellingLong SpellingShort 
5 Request to 
Click on 
Links 
LinksShort Links1 LinksMed LinksLong 
     Randomization of experiment groups (AV, H, & AVH) was addressed by randomizing 
alert and warning examples as shown in Table 7. Each participant saw a total of 20 
simulated emails during PAWS mobile app testing. Each experiment group contained an 
example of one of the top five signs of phishing. Group one, NAVH (no audio, visual, or 
haptic) was presented to all participants first for the first five simulated email screens 
shown to the participant. The randomization of both email length, alert, and warning 










Email Version  
Group 
1 UrgencyShort No AVH 
2 ActionLong No AVH 
3 InfoMed No AVH 
4 Spelling1 No AVH 
5 LinksShort No AVH 
6 UrgencyLong AVH 
7 Action1 H 
8 InfoLong AV   
9 SpellingShort AVH 
10 LinksMed H 
11 Urgency1 AV 
12 ActionMed AVH 
13 InfoShort H 
14 SpellingMed AV 
15 LinksLong AVH 
16 UrgencyMed H 
17 ActionShort AV 
18 Info1 AVH 
19 SpellingLong H  
20 Links1 AV 
Effectiveness of the Prototype 
The initial survey measured SMEs’ response pertaining to the validity and 
provided ranking for the signs of phishing in emails, A/V/H pairings, and the tasks used 
for the measurements of (a) ability to notice, (b) time to notice, and (c) ability to notice 
signs of phishing in emails. Pilot testing of the PAWS mobile application was completed 
prior to PAWS participant study with five testers to ensure all measures were valid, and 
any data or performance issues were resolved. Multiple specifically testing was 
completed to ensure the PAWS mobile application properly recorded the score associated 




sampled emails available in the application. Moreover, multiple testing was completed to 
ensure the PAWS mobile app recorded the time (in seconds) associated with the user’s 
time to notice and was compared to the time (in seconds) accurately. Several audio alerts 
were collected from warning systems, formatted to play as an audio clip with visuals, and 
then presented to the SMEs in a companion survey form for ranking preferences.  
Validity and Reliability 
To design a measure that has both high validity and reliability, this study utilized 
sequential exploratory developmental research combining both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies along with the development of the PAWS mobile app. This 
research included three phases for development, testing, and data collection of the PAWS 
mobile application. The first data collection point was Phase I. SMEs were asked to (1) 
rank signs of phishing in order of importance, (2) Pair/match audio warnings with what 
they felt was the appropriate for each sign of phishing, (3) Pair/match visual warnings 
with what they felt was the appropriate visual icon for each sign of phishing, (4) 
Pair/match haptic warnings with what they felt was the appropriate haptic warning 
timing. (5) Provide their perspective on the tasks for the measure of ability to notice 
phishing in emails (6) Provide their perspective on the measure of time to notice phishing 
in emails, and (7) Provide their perspective on measurement of ability to notice signs of 
phishing in emails. The Delphi methodology of development and validation of Phase I 
initial list and library by SMEs was used as the input to Phase II (Tracy & Richey, 2007). 
Delphi methodology is a well-established qualitative and quantitative research elicitation 
process to enable a group of experts to reach consensus on specific set of requirements or 




pilot user testing and qualitative feedback for improvements towards the PAWS mobile 
app prototype. This step also included the exploratory research design steps of building 
the PAWS mobile app prototype. Pre-analysis data screening was conducted in Phase II 
(See section “Pre-Analysis Data Screening” below). Phase III encompassed all of the 
participant data, qualitative and quantitative data collection, validity verification, and 
statistical analysis.  
Reliability 
 During the first data collection in Phase I, $10.00 Amazon gift cards were 
awarded to the SMEs to ensure their participation. This was in effort to increase 
reliability in SME responses and commitment to the research study. To produce stable 
and accurate PAWS results, consistent object measurement was completed by hard 
coding the PAWS mobile application. Each participant saw exactly the same simulated 
email screens, in the same order. To ensure participant scores represent accurate 
variables, internal consistency was used to correlate reliable performance over all 
participant data (Salkind, 2003).  
Validity 
 Validity was an important measure in this research process to ensure instrument 
measures (Straub, 1989). As indicated by Salkind (2003) content validity was addressed 
through the literature review of this research. The literature synthesis represents the body 
of knowledge surrounding available examples of signs of phishing in emails. This 
information formed the SME survey for the SME ranking of the top signs of phishing in 
emails. Criterion validity was addressed by utilizing SME feedback for (a) ability to 




information was the basis of measurement for participant criterion (Salkind, 2003). 
Construct validity (Salkind, 2003) was ensured by utilizing the literature synthesis of this 
research to establish a foundation for (a) prior studies with simulated and real phishing 
emails, (b) prior surveys regarding demographics, and (c) effects of end user phishing 
training, and (d) prior studies and tests founded upon attention span. 
Bias can also be an issue with application development. Bias was controlled by 
ensuring only SME validated content appeared for the simulated phishing slides in the 
PAWS mobile application. Bias questions were addressed for the demographic surveys 
by using templated Survey Monkey demographic surveys as opposed to self-created 
questions and surveys (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Reliability and validity were critical to 
this research study. Mitigation steps were taken to reduce threats to the research data 
validity and reliability (Ellis & Levy, 2006). 
Population and Sample 
 To achieve the required approximately 25 SMEs, for the SMEs survey, personal 
networks were contacted to solicit about 40 cybersecurity experts, with the anticipation 
that at least 25 of them would agree to participate. Screening for SMEs participation was 
verified by preliminary survey questions: Cybersecurity degree obtained, years in 
cybersecurity, professional cybersecurity/IT certifications, and current job position as 
shown in Appendix A. Participants were requested to participate in the study from the 
researcher’s LinkedIn contacts and through researcher’s email contacts. Amazon gift 
cards for $10.00 were awarded to the SMEs upon participation in the initial survey. A 




For the PAWS mobile application study, a sample of the population was used to 
gather a representation of the general population (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). At least 150 
participants were recruited for the PAWS mobile application study, targeting a minimum 
100 participants in order to show statistical power and significance (Cohen,1988). 
Sample of convenience method was used from personal networks to recruit the 
participants. This method was limited as more participants could have involved if socially 
linked to the researcher. Recruiting was done in English. Screening for study participants 
was verified by preliminary questions in the demographic survey as shown in Appendix 
B. Participants needed to be 18 years of age or older, have at least one email account, use 
a mobile device, and check their email on a mobile device.  
Pre-Analysis Data Screening  
Pre-analysis data screening was utilized on collected data before the full 
analyzation of collected data occurs. This step prevented the majority of data collection 
errors (Levy & Ellis, 2006). To verify inaccurate data entry, visual verification was 
performed before manual data entry of data collected. This study also used pre-analysis 
data screening methods (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013).  Mertler and Vannatta (2013) 
indicated pre-analysis data screening is needed to ensure accuracy of data collected. 
Validation of this data included examining the variables to ensure no values are outside 
of the expected range. Test data was also be checked to ensure coded values had 
corresponding categories. Missing data, extreme values, and assumptions were analyzed 







Data analysis for Phase I was conducted through Survey Monkey analysis tools. 
Semantic differential scale was used for the SMEs to rank the top signs of phishing. 
During the same survey, the SMEs frequency majority opinion of ability to notice and 
time to notice phishing in emails was be recorded. The highest rate of choice for each 
SMEs survey question will be used towards the PAWS mobile application. Each SME 
opinion on amount of time it should take a user to notice a sign of phishing in emails, and 
the length of time it should take to measure ability to notice signs of phishing in emails 
were anonymously recorded. Responses were recorded and analyzed determining 
frequency analysis for the top signs of phishing in emails, A/V pairings, ability to notice, 
time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails – addressing research 
questions RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4. Phase II data was recorded and analyzed through 
PAWS mobile app development and testing and answered RQ5. The final phase of this 
research study included data analysis from the participant actions during PAWS testing 
and answered RQ6a, RQ6b, RQ6c, RQ7a, RQ7b, and RQ7c. Data analysis was 
performed on the results of this study for each participant and compared to participant 
groups. The participant groups were coded into groups for specific analysis.  
Participants were asked to click the corresponding buttons when they noticed a 
sign of phishing in any of the 20 simulated emails presented to them from the PAWS 
mobile app. Measurements included participants’ ability to notice signs of phishing in 
emails, time to notice phishing in emails, age, gender, experience with phishing training, 




Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test for significant differences 
between groups. One-Way ANOVA testing was used to answer RQ6a, RQ6b, and RQ6c 
as well as on the data collected following Mertler and Vannatta (2013) guidance for 
addressing RQ7a, RQ7b, and RQ7c.  
Resources 
 This study was reviewed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) as human 
participants are involved in the study. A Survey Monkey license was utilized for the 
initial survey. Information security and cybersecurity SMEs were needed for the initial 
survey. LinkedIn and was used to contact SMEs and PAWS mobile app participants.  An 
application developer was needed for the development of the PAWS prototype and 
application. A graphic designer was needed for the creation of email screens and PAWS 
branding. This study also required an online database for data collection for survey and 
prototype data. SPSS software was needed for data analysis, coding, and presentation of 
results. Access to mobile devices was needed for testing. A set of 25 x $10.00 Amazon 
gift cards were needed for requested SME participation rewards. 
Summary 
 An overview of the research methodology was provided in this chapter. Utilizing 
a mixed method approach, quantitative and qualitative data was used to develop, validate, 
test, and collect research data. This research answered the following research questions: 
The main Research Question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What 
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system combination can be used to empirically 





RQ1: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of phishing in emails that are 
considered the most critical threats to users? 
RQ2: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings are most 
valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails?   
RQ3: What are the SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to
 notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails? 
RQ4: What is the SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice 
signs of phishing in emails? 
RQ5: What validation and testing procedures should be considered in order to 
deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system prototype? 
RQ6a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS?  
RQ6b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to 
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS? 
RQ6c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS? 
RQ7a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) 
gender, (c) experience with phishing awareness training, and (d) attention 
span? 
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users time to 
notice phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) 




RQ7c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age, 
(b) gender, (c) prior phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention 
span? 
The RQs were addressed over three phases using developmental design, 
qualitative, and quantitative methods to construct and validate the PAWS mobile app. 
Phase one collected SMEs feedback, utilizing Delphi methodology towards the top signs 
of phishing in emails, SMEs chosen audio/visual/haptic warnings, as well as SMEs 
opinion on ability to notice, time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing in 
emails. Phase two encompassed the development and testing of the PAWS mobile app 
prototype utilizing findings from Phase one and pilot testing.  Phase three included the 
study itself with the participants. Data collected included demographic information, 
attention span scores, data towards ability to notice, time to notice signs, and ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with and without audio, visual, as well as haptic alerts 










   
Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis from this 
research study. The main goal was to determine an audio/visual/haptic alert and warning 
system combination could be used to empirically assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and 
(b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails on mobile devices. For Phase I, results were 
presented from a one-round Delphi survey using a panel of 32 cybersecurity experts. The 
SMEs validated the top signs of phishing in emails, as well as: audio/visual/haptic 
warnings to pair with the emails. Phase I also identified SME opinion regarding ability to 
notice, time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails that were then used 
towards development of the PAWS mobile app. Phase II utilized SME results from the 
SME survey, development, coding, and user testing of the PAWS mobile app prototype, 
as well as qualitative and quantitative feedback from pilot testers. The PAWS Mobile 
App is a custom, mobile application available on the Apple App Store, and Google Play 
Store. Phase III results are presented from the PAWS mobile app study with 205 
participants utilizing ANOVA, ANCOVA, and frequency analysis of participant 
interaction.  
Phase I – SME Survey Feedback and Findings 
RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 were answered through s survey instrument during the 
first phase of this research study. Invitation emails to participate in the Subject Matter 




respondents. An SME panel of 32 cybersecurity experts were surveyed in one Delphi 
Method (Rahim & Lichvar, 2014) cycle with a 71.1% response rate, meeting consensus 
on the survey questions. Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics of the 32 respondents. 
Cybersecurity and information security experts included current college professors with 
classroom and industry experience (40.63%) and current cybersecurity industry 
professionals (59.39%). Industry professionals included C-level executive managers 
(9.37%), senior managers (18.74%), middle managers (9.38%) security analysts (9.38%), 
and other cybersecurity positions (12.50%). Over 56% of the respondents had over 10 
years of cybersecurity or information security industry experience followed by 28% at 
five to 10 years of experience. SMEs with three to five years of experience (3.13%), one 
to three years of experience (6.25%), and one year or less (6.25%) also participated in the 
SME survey. Descriptive statistics of the SMEs are shown in Table 9.  
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics of SMEs (N=32) 
 
Demographic Item       N  % 
Current Position:   
     Owner/Executive/C-Level 3 9.37% 
     Senior Management 6 18.74% 
     Middle Management 3 9.38% 
     IT Security Analyst 3 9.38% 
     Professor 13 40.63% 
     Other 4 12.50% 
          Private Practice (1)  
          IT Senior Auditor (1)  
          IT Security Staff (1)  
          Cybersecurity Investigator (1)  
Experience in Information Security:   
     1 Year or Less 2 6.25% 
     1-3 Years 2 6.25% 
     3-5 Years 1 3.13% 
     5-10 Years 9 28.13% 




Phase I - RQ1 
To answer the research question: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of 
phishing in emails that are considered the most critical threats to users, SMEs ranked 
what they felt the top signs of phishing were in the SME survey. The SMEs’ top signs of 
phishing in emails that they consider the most critical threats to users are shown in Table 
10. All 32 of the SMEs ranked the top signs of phishing in emails. Frequency analysis 
was used to determine the highest frequency of ranking among the 32 SMEs. Sense of 
Urgency was the top sign of phishing (11.32%), followed by requiring action from the 
recipient (11.22%), ranking third highest was request for information from the recipient 
(8.87%), followed by misspelling and grammar issues in fourth rank (8.54%), and request 
to click on links as the number five sign of phishing in emails (8.34%).  
Table 10 
SME Top Five Signs of Phishing in Emails – Ranked (N=32) 
Survey Question               Rank           % 
Rank Signs of Phishing:   
     Sense of Urgency 1 11.32% 
     Requiring Action 2 11.22% 
     Request for Information  3 8.87% 
     Misspelling and Grammar 4 8.53% 
     Request to Click on Links 5 8.34% 
 
Phase I - RQ2 
To answer the research question: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts 
and warnings are most valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails, SMEs voted 
on their preferred pairings in the SME survey. The SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic 
warning alerts to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails were determined through 
SME survey answers. Each question was represented in a companion PowerPoint 




from the email recipient, is shown in Figure 24. Each sign of phishing had a 
corresponding figure for SMEs’ voting of their most preferred icon in the survey. Table 
11 illustrates frequency analysis performed toward SME consensus on visual icons for 
the PAWS mobile app. 
Figure 24 




SME Rank of Icon Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32) 
 
Survey Question           N  % 
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Urgency:   
     Purple Alarm with Yellow Lines 15 46.88% 
     Red Alarm 16 50.00% 
     Purple Stopwatch 1 3.12% 
  
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Requiring 
Action: 
  
     Running Person 14 43.75% 
     Red and White X 11 34.38% 











SME Rank of Icon Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32) – (cont.) 
 
Survey Question           N  % 
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Request for 
Information: 
  
     Purple Icon and “i” 12 37.50% 
     Red Button with “i” 17 53.13% 
     Purple Arrow Over Text Box 3 9.37% 
  
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Misspelling 
and Grammar Issues: 
  
     Purple and Yellow “Aa” 6 18.74% 
     Red and Black Circle “Aa” 11 34.38% 
     Purple Pencil with “x” 15 46.88%  
 
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Request to 
click on Links: 
  
     Purple Link 7 21.88% 
     White Link on Red Background 21 65.63% 
     Purple Down Arrow 4 12.49% 
SME pairing of visual icons for the top signs of phishing in emails resulted in 
46.88% of SMEs choosing a red alarm as the best representation of the sign of phishing 
sense of urgency. Requiring action resulted in a running person icon as the chosen match 
from SMEs (43.75%). SME pairings for request for information was a red button “i” with 
17 votes (53.13%). SMEs decided misspelling and grammar issues should be represented 
as a purple pencil with an “x” with 46.88% of SME votes. Request to click on links was 
determined to be paired with a white link on a red background with 21 SME votes 
(65.63%). Figure 25 illustrates the final icons paired with the top five signs of phishing in 







SME Visual Icon Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails 
 
SMEs ranking of the audio and haptic pairings as shown in Table 12 resulted in 
the consensus that the audio alerts would be most effective as a female voice over alert, 
receiving 34.38% of the SME consensus. Other audio choices were stock mobile device 
sounds (iPhone, Android alerts) (28.13%), household alert sounds (fire alarms, 
microwave sounds) (18.75%), and automobile alert sounds (seatbelt alerts, tire pressure 
warnings, check engine alerts) (18.75%). The SMEs panel also determined that 
shaking/vibration alerts should happen immediately upon the recipient seeing the 
simulated email on the mobile screen with SME consensus at 38.71%. Other haptic 
presentation choices included one second after the simulated email appears (29.03%), 
two seconds after the simulated email appears (16.13%), and three seconds after the 
simulated email appears (16.13%). Female voice over audible warnings, as well as 
haptic/vibration upon participants viewing simulated emails were used for the PAWS 






SME Rank of Audio and Haptic Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32) 
 
Survey Question           N  % 
Which Audio Alert Group Would Be the Most Effective in 
Alerting Participants to Signs of Phishing in Email: 
  
      Stock Mobile Device Notification Sounds  9 28.13% 
      Household Alert Sounds (Fire alarm, Microwave sounds) 6 18.75% 
      Automobile Alert Sounds (Seatbelt ding) 6 18.75% 
      Voice Over Description of The Sign of Phishing   11 34.38% 
  
Haptic/Shaking Alerts Will Be Presented to The Participants. 
When Should the Mobile Device Shake Upon an Email 
Appearing on The Screen: 
  
      Immediately as The Email Appears 12 38.71% 
      One Second After the Email Appears 9 29.03% 
      Two Seconds After the Email Appears 5 16.13% 
      Three Seconds After the Email Appears 5 16.13% 
 
Phase I - RQ3 
The SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to notice, and (b) time 
to notice signs of phishing in emails was answered by SME survey questions. The SMEs’ 
validated tasks for users’ demographic indicators of ability to notice signs of phishing in 
emails are illustrated in Table 13. The highest rank of ability to notice include the email 
recipient’s experience with phishing training (90.63%), followed by the email recipient’s 
experience with being phished (84.38%), experience reading emails (75%), attention span 
(59.38%), age (56.25%), native language spoken (46.88%), clicking “Legitimate” or 
“Phishing” buttons (34.38%), and gender (3.13%). SME consensus answers were 
integrated into the development of PAWS mobile app demographic questions to analyze 








SME Rank of Determining Factors for The Ability to Notice Top Signs of Phishing in 
Emails (N=32)  
Survey Question        N % 
What Determines a Recipient’s Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in 
Emails: 
  
     Ability to Click “Legitimate “or “Phishing”  11 34.38% 
     Age 18 56.25% 
     Gender 1 3.13% 
     Native Language Spoken 15 46.88% 
     Attention Span 19 59.38% 
     Experience with Emails 24 75.00% 
     Experience with Phishing Training 29 90.63% 
     Past Experience with Being Phished  27 84.38% 
SMEs determined that participant’s ability to notice top signs of phishing they 
saw in emails is the key indicator of ability to notice signs of phishing in emails with a 
consensus of 90.32% as shown in Table 14. Ability to correctly click legitimate or 
phishing buttons (41.94%), and the time it takes to click legitimate or phishing buttons 
(38.71%) were also measured towards the ability to notice signs of phishing in emails. 
Table 13 illustrates the SME tasks that further determine a user’s ability to notice signs of 
phishing in emails. The SMEs indicated the recipient of the email needs the ability to 
notice what signs of phishing they saw in the email, followed (in importance) by the time 
it takes to click legitimate or phishing buttons. 
Table 14 
SME Rank of Tasks for The Ability to Notice Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32) 
Survey Question             N % 
What Are Some Tasks That Determine a Recipient’s Ability to 
Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails: 
   
     The ability to correctly to Click “Legitimate “or “Phishing”   12 38.71% 
     Time it Takes to Click “Legitimate “or “Phishing” Buttons  13 41.94% 






Phase I - RQ 4 
SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice signs of phishing in 
emails was answered by SME survey question. As illustrated by Table 15, the SMEs 
indicate 25 seconds (28.13%) is the maximum time to lapse before it is determined the 
email recipient did not notice signs of phishing in the email. Other SME responses 




SME Rank of Maximum Time to Notice Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32) 
Survey Question        N % 
What Is the Maximum Time to Lapse Before It Is Determined the 
Recipient Did Not Notice Signs of Phishing in the Emails: 
  
       5 Seconds 2 6.25% 
       15 Seconds 5 15.63% 
       25 Seconds 9 28.13% 
       35 Seconds 6 18.75% 
       45 Seconds 2 6.25% 
       55 Seconds 0 0.0% 
       60 Seconds 3 9.38% 
       65 Seconds 0 0.0% 
       70 Seconds 0 0.0% 
       75 Seconds 0 0.0% 
       80 Seconds 1 3.13% 
       85 Seconds 0 0.0% 
       More Than 90 Seconds 4 12.50% 
Phase II - PAWS Mobile App Development 
Phase II included the development of PAWS, the mobile prototype and study 
application. SME consensus on audio, visual, haptic feedback, top signs of phishing, 
ability to notice signs of phishing measures, time to notice measures, ability to notice 




used. Development of the application involved programming two factor authentications 
to ensure participant validity and uniqueness. The initial login screen shown in Figure 26.  
Figure 26 
PAWS Mobile App Screen – Login Screen Example 
 
Demographic questions, and attention span questions were asked of the 
participants and reviewed by the NSU IRB board. Simulated emails for the PAWS test 
were programmed and organized based on SME consensus. The PAWS mobile app was 




PAWS Test, and Post- PAWS survey. The PAWS mobile app four sections were 
presented to the participants as shown in Figure 27. 
Figure 27 
PAWS Mobile App Screen – Four Sections Screen Example 
 
 
Phase II - RQ5 
The Phase I SMEs survey, as well as a pilot test of the PAWS mobile app was 




be considered to deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system. Table 16 further 
identifies SMEs feedback towards an audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system 
combination can be used to empirically assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to 
notice signs of phishing in emails. SMEs feedback indicated the four email alert and 
warning groups: no alerts or warnings (NAVH), audio and visual alerts and warnings 
(AV), haptic alerts and warnings (H), and audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings (AVH), 
should be presented in a specific manner to alleviate participant habituation, and fatigue. 
It was determined the top five signs of phishing should be shown for each alert and 
warning group. This resulted in 20 simulated email screens for the alert and warning 
system. Combined with feedback regarding the top signs of phishing, audio/visual/haptic 
alerts and warnings, constructs for an audio/visual/haptic phishing alert and warning 
system were created.  
Table 16 
 
SME Rank of Presentation Order of Alerts and Warnings to The Top Signs of Phishing in 
Emails (N=32) 
 
Survey Question        N % 
How Should Emails Without Audio, Visual, or Haptic Alerts and 
Warnings be Presented: 
  
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order 7 21.88% 
     Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order 20 62.50% 
     Show the Top 5 First, and 6-10 after AVH Warnings are Presented 5 15.63%  
   
How Should Emails with Haptic Alerts and Warnings Be Presented:   
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order 5 15.63% 
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing in Randomized Order 4 12.50% 
     Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order 17 53.13% 











SME Rank of Presentation Order of Alerts and Warnings to The Top Signs of Phishing in 
Emails (N=32) – (cont.) 
 
Survey Question        N % 
How Should Emails with Audio and Visual Alerts and Warnings Be 
Presented: 
  
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order 9 28.13% 
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing in Randomized Order 5 15.63% 
     Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order 12 37.50% 
     Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in Randomized Order 6 18.75%  
How Should Emails with Audio/visual/haptic Alerts and Warnings Be 
Presented: 
  
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order 6 18.75% 
     Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing in Randomized Order 9 28.13% 
     Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order 13 40.63% 
     Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in Randomized Order 4 12.50% 
Phase II - PAWS Development and Pilot Testing 
As previously shown, randomization of emails by alert group and by email length 
were considered while coding and programing the PAWS mobile app prototype. All 
participants saw the same, randomized order of PAWS screens. The top five signs of 
phishing were represented by signs one through five being shown to the participant in a 
randomized order for the group NAVH (no audio, visual, or haptic alerts and warnings), 
followed by randomization of the other three alert and warning groups (totaling 15 
simulated email screens) for AV (audio/visual alerts and warnings), H (haptic alerts and 
warnings), and AVH (audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings).  
Qualitative and quantitative measures were used to test the prototype. Functions 
and effectiveness were measured with binary scores (Sauro & Lewis, 2012). Backend 
database data recording accuracy was verified by in-person user testing observation. This 
method was used to ensure accuracy of the database recording of how long the participant 




participant.  User testing observation was also utilized to verify database accuracy when 
participants were clicking what sign of phishing they saw on the simulated email screen.  
Several issues were documented, corrected, and retested during Phase II of the 
study. Audible feedback to the researcher was used during the testing phase as an issue 
tracking mechanism (Rubin & Chisnell, 2008). Primarily, several signs of phishing were 
able to be clicked on the “what signs of phishing did you notice” screen. The issue was 
corrected to allow only one click and retested. User testing also indicated simulated 
phishing emails screens text was too small. All screens were redesigned with larger text 
to increase legibility. User testing also revealed a “Back” button was available allowing 
participants to review the last email viewed. This was removed to rely on participant 
memory to “match” the sign of phishing they believed they saw with the choices of signs 
of phishing. Additionally, visual icons for both the AV and AVH groups were appearing 
at the same time as the simulated email screen. This feature was reprogrammed to appear 
after the email was displayed for one second for the icon to look like an alert rather than 
part of the email. Figure 28 is shown with a visual icon, and short text version of the 
spelling and grammar issues sign of phishing. Participants were asked to click 
“Legitimate” or “Phishing” upon seeing each simulated email, and then choose what sign 
of phishing they saw if “Phishing” was clicked. Figure 29 is shown with the final design 
after user testing and additional corrective programming and adjustment. Final designs 
for all groups (NAVH, AV, H, & AVH) included audio sounds for all AV and AVH 
signs of phishing upon opening of the simulated email screen. H and AVH groups 




A Post-PAWS survey was added as the fourth part of the PAWS test to increase 
validity and reduce errors for individual participation. Participants were asked if their 
mobile device shook, made any audible sounds, and if they experienced any delays 
(phone calls, notifications) while taking the PAWS test. This information could be 
analyzed for individual results to explain potential outliers and skewed data. A free-form 
text box was also added as the last participant question for the participants to add any 
questions or concerns they might have had. This also helped researcher feedback in real-
time as the mobile app was being delivered to the participants.  
Figure 28 





Phase III – PAWS Mobile App Delivery 
 Phase III included the application study of PAWS with participants. Data 
collection occurred from June 1, 2020 to June 24, 2020. The participants were personal 
and professional contacts of the and participants recruited through LinkedIn social media 
posts. A total of 214 participants downloaded the PAWS Mobile App and participated in 
the study.  
Phase III – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
 There were 214 total participants for this study. Eight participants did not 
complete the study and were removed from the final participant data list. SPSS 
Statistics™ version 25 was used to conduct analysis on the PAWS Mobile App 
participants answers. Mahalanobis Distance procedure (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017) 
determined one multivariate outlier with value 130.78. This outlier was removed from 
further analysis. The final sample size for this study was 205. 
Phase III – Participant Demographics Characteristics 
 The 205 participants included several demographic areas. Demographic 
information is shown on Table 17. There were six age groups for the study. Group 1 (18-
20) included 11.2% of the participants with a value of 23 participants. Group 2 (21-29) 
was 26.8%, Group 3 (30-39) was 21.5% with 44 participants. Group 4 (40-49) was 
20.5%, Group 5 (50-59) was 12.7%. Group 6 (60 and older) included 7.3% of the study 
population. Gender was almost evenly distributed with 100 female participants, 101 male 
participants, and four participants that chose not to answer the gender demographic 
question. Experience with phishing training was also asked in the demographic question 




did not have prior phishing training, 6.8% were not sure if they have had prior phishing 
training, and 1.0% preferred to not answer the question. Attention span scores were also 
recorded from the attention span portion of the PAWS study.  
Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics of PAWS Participants (N=205) 
Demographic Item       N  % 
Age Group: 
1. 18-20        23  11.2% 
2. 21-29        55  26.8% 
3. 30-39        44  21.5% 
4. 40-49        42  20.5% 
5. 50-59        26  12.7% 
6. 60+        15  7.3% 
Gender: 
1. Female       100  48.8% 
2. Male        101  49.3% 
3. Prefer to not answer       4  2.0% 
Experience with Phishing Awareness Training: 
1. Yes        101  49.3%  
2. No        88  42.9%  
3. Not Sure       14  6.8% 
4. Prefer to not answer      2  1.0% 
Attention Span Score: 
1. 3,7,9        (3)  1.5% 
2. 10        2  1.0% 
3. 11        8  3.9% 
4. 12        5  2.4% 
5. 13        10  4.9% 
6. 14        17  8.3% 
7. 15        18  8.8% 
8. 16        21  10.2% 
9. 17        16  7.8% 
10. 18        23  11.2% 
11. 19        19  9.3% 
12. 20        11  5.4% 
13. 21        18  8.8% 
14. 22        13  6.3% 
15. 23        6  2.9% 
16. 24        8  3.9% 
17. 25        3  1.5% 




Phase III - RQ6a 
To answer if any statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ 
ability to notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS, Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was used to test for significant differences between groups. The results of the 
one-way ANOVA showed there were significant differences among all PAWS groups for 
ATN, TTN, and ATNS. ATN (F(3,816) = 7.53, p <0.001), TTN (F(3,816) = 6.39, p 
<0.001), and ATNS (F(3,816) = 115.7, p <0.001). The p-values of the F-test were less 
than .05 level of significance. Results are shown in Table 18.  
Table 18 
 
ANOVA Results of Difference in PAWS Groups (N=205) 
 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square   F Sig. 
ATN  11.72   3 3.90   7.53 0.000*** 
TTN  59064.31  3 19688.10  6.39 0.000*** 
ATNS  456.51   3 1.31   115.7 0.000*** 
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
This section represents the results of descriptive statistics between groups for 
ATN, TTN, and ATNS among all 205 participants for Group 1 (NAVH), Group 2 (AV), 
Group 3 (H), and Group 4 (AVH). Descriptive statistics for RQ6 are shown in Table 19.  
Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 29 
for analysis on ability to notice phishing. Group 2, AV (audio and visual alerting) was the 









Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and TTNS (N=205) 




 95% Confidence 







ATN NAVH 205 4.40 .826 .058 4.29 4.51 
AV 205 4.65 .620 .043 4.57 4.74 
H 205 4.57 .835 .058 4.45 4.68 
AVH 
 
205 4.36 .557 .039 4.28 4.44 
TTN NAVH 205 112.61 51.690 3.610 105.49 119.73 
 AV 205 90.75 59.039 4.123 82.62 98.88 
 H 205 95.58 52.530 3.669 88.34 102.81 
 AVH 
 
205 105.35 58.380 4.077 97.31 113.39 
ATNS NAVH 205 1.08 .928 .065 .96 1.21 
 AV 205 2.90 1.388 .097 2.71 3.09 
 H 205 2.00 .929 .065 1.87 2.13 
 AVH 205 2.87 1.269 .089 2.70 3.05 
Figure 29 





Phase III - RQ6b 
Statistically significant mean differences among users’ time to notice phishing in 
emails with or without PAWS is represented in Figure 31. Based on mean comparisons 
shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 30 for analysis on time to notice 
phishing. Group 2, AV (audio and visual alerting) was the best performing group and 
shows the least amount of time to notice phishing among the participants.  
Figure 30 
Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by NAVH, AV, H, and AVH (N=205) 
 
 
Phase III - RQ6c 
 To discover if statistically significant mean differences among users’ ability to 




Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 31 
for analysis on ability to notice phishing. Group 2, AV (audio and visual alerting) was the 
best performing group and shows the strongest ability to notice signs of phishing among 
the participants.  
Figure 31 
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by NAVH, AV, H, and AVH  
(N=205) 
 
Phase III - RQ7a, RQ7b, RQ7c 
Statistically significant mean differences among users’ ability to notice, time to 
notice, and ability to notice signs phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) 
age, (b) gender, (c) prior phishing awareness training, and (d) attention span are were 




Phase III – RQ7 – Age Group 
Table 20 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were 
significant differences among all four PAWS experiments groups and age groups. The 
results indicated there were significant differences among age groups (18-20, 21-29, 30-
39, 40-49,50-59, 60+) for ATN (ability to notice) ATN, (F(5,814) = 7.72, p <0.001). 
There were also significant differences among age groups for TTN (time to notice), 
(F(5,814) = 8.10, and significant differences for ATNS (ability to notice signs) (F(5,814) 
= 2.20, p = 0.052). 
Table 20 
 
ANCOVA Results of Difference in ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Age Group (N=205) 
 
   Sum of Squares df Mean Square    F Sig. 
ATN   19.71   5 3.94  7.72    0.000*** 
TTN   121999.53  5 24399.90 8.10    0.000*** 
ATNS   20.46   5 4.09  2.20    0.052*  
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for age group 
are represented by mean in Table 21, and Figures 32-34. The highest performing age 
group among the 205 study participants was 50-59-years old with a mean score of 4.65 
for ability to notice phishing, followed closely by 40-49 and 30-39 years old groups with 
a mean score of 4.59. Age group two, or 21-29 years old were able to notice signs of 
phishing in the least amount of time by mean (82.09), and 40-49-years old were the best 
performing group for noticing signs of phishing in emails with the PAWS Mobile App by 
mean (2.43), followed by 21-29 years old with a mean score of 2.32 among PAWS 







Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and TTNS by Age Group (N=205)  
DV      Age Group           Mean      Std.Dev.          Std. Error 
ATN 18-20 4.13 .773 .081 
21-39 4.41 .803 .054 
30-39 4.59 .671 .051 
40-49 4.59 .650 .050 
50-59 4.65 .650 .064 
60+ 4.57 .673 .087 
TTN 18-20 105.50 52.671 94.59 
 21-29 82.09 52.590 75.10 
 30-39 109.69 52.502 101.88 
 40-49 104.55 50.694 96.83 
 50-59 105.63 66.828 92.64 
 60+ 120.93 61.297 105.10 
ATNS 18-20 1.98 1.334 .139 
 21-39 2.32 1.487 .100 
 30-39 2.07 1.294 .098 
 40-49 2.43 1.369 .106 
 50-59 2.11 1.238 .121 
 60+ 2.18 1.295 .167 
Figure 32 






Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Age Group (N=205) 
 
Figure 34 





Phase III – RQ7 – By Gender Group 
 
Table 22 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were 
significant differences among all four PAWS experiment groups and gender. The results 
indicated there were no significant differences among gender groups (female, male, and 
choose to not answer) for ATN (ability to notice), (F(2,817) = 1.957, p =0.142). 
Significant differences were shown for TTN (time to notice), (F(2,817) = 3.970, p 
=0.019), and no significant differences for ATNS (ability to notice signs) by gender 
(F(2,817) = 1.597, p =0.203). 
Table 22 
 
ANCOVA Results of Difference in ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Gender Group (N=205) 
   Sum of Squares df Mean Square    F Sig. 
ATN   2.074   2 1.037  1.957    0.142 
TTN   24768.196  2 12384.098 3.970    0.019*  
ATNS   5.957   2 2.979  1.597    0.203 
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for gender 
group are represented by mean in Table 23, and Figures 35-37. Ability to notice phishing 
mean scores were female at 4.45, male at 4.54 and N/A at 4.63 with no significant 
statistical significance. Mean analysis for time to notice phishing indicated the four 
participants that chose to not answer the gender identification question were able to 
notice signs of phishing in less time among the gender groups. Ability to notice signs of 
phishing in emails analysis among gender groups indicated female mean scores at 2.24, 









Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Gender Group (N=205) 
 
DV               Gender      Mean  Std.Dev. Std. Error 
ATN Female 4.45 .764 .038 
Male 4.54 .698 .035 
N/A 4.63 .500 .125 
TTN Female 99.61 54.654 2.733 
 Male 103.94 57.743 2.873 
 N/A 65.19 29.492 7.373 
ATNS Female 2.24 1.361 .068 
 Male 2.16 1.343 .067 
 N/A 2.75 1.949 .487 
 
Figure 35 










Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Gender Group (N=205) 
 
Figure 37 






Phase III – RQ7 – By Prior Experience with Phishing Training Group (N=205) 
 
Table 24 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were 
significant differences among all four PAWS experiment groups and prior phishing 
training among the participants. and The results indicated there were significant 
differences among phishing training groups (prior training, no prior training, not sure if 
training was received, and choose to not answer) for ATN (ability to notice), (F(3,816) = 
8.319, p <0.001),  no significant differences for TTN (time to notice), (F(3,816) = 1.517, 
p = 0.209), and significant differences for ATNS (ability to notice signs) by phishing 
training group (F(3,816) = 4.925, p = 0.002). 
Table 24 
 
ANCOVA Results of Difference of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Prior Experience with 
Phishing Training Group (N=205) 
 
   Sum of Squares df Mean Square  F Sig. 
ATN   12.908   3 4.303  8.319     0.000*** 
TTN   14275.368  3 4758.456 1.517     0.209 
ATNS   27.203   3 9.068  4.925     0.002** 
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for prior 
phishing training group are represented by mean in Table 25, and Figures 38-40.  
Participants with prior phishing training totaled a mean score of 4.41 and those without 
prior phishing training at 4.63 indicating phishing training made a minimal difference on 
noticing phishing emails among the 205 participants. Mean scores for time to notice 
phishing were 98.87 for those with training, 103.82 for those without training, and 105.00 
and 68.25 for those not sure if they have had phishing training in the past, and those 








Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Prior Experience with Phishing 
Training Group (N=205) 
 
DV         Training      Mean  Std.Dev.       Std. Error 
ATN Training 4.41 .788 .039 
No training 4.63 .604 .032 
Not sure 4.23 .853 .114 
No answer 
 
4.63 .744 .263 
TTN Training 98.78 60.347 .067 
 No training 103.82 48.818 .071 
 Not sure 105.00 67.183 .192 
 No answer 
 
68.25 30.946 10.941 
ATNS Training 2.08 1.355 .067 
 No training 2.35 1.333 .071 
 Not sure 2.13 1.440 .192 
 No answer 3.50 1.852 .655 
 
Figure 38 
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Phishing Emails by Prior Experience with Phishing 








Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Prior Experience with Phishing 
Training Group (N=205) 
 
Figure 40 
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by Prior Experience with 








Phase III – RQ7 – By Attention Span Score Group (N=205) 
 
Table 26 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were 
significant differences among all four PAWS experiment groups and attention span 
scores among the participants. The results showed there were significant differences 
among attention span scores among the participants for ATN (ability to notice), 
(F(19,800) = 2.038, p <0.006). There were significant differences for TTN (time to 
notice), (F(19,800) = 3.456, p <0.001),  and no significant differences for ATNS (ability 
to notice signs) by attention span score (F(19,800) = 0.714, p =0.807.  
Table 26 
 
ANCOVA Results of Difference of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Attention Span Score Group 
(N=205) 
 
   Sum of Squares df Mean Square  F Sig. 
ATN   20.081   19 1.057  2.038     0.006** 
TTN   195196.490  19 10273.499 3.456     0.000*** 
ATNS   25.509   19 1.343  0.714   0.807 
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001 
Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for attention 
span score are represented by mean in Table 27, and Figures 41-43. Among PAWS 
experiment groups. Attention span score of nine (high-attention span) with a mean score 
of 5.0 were able to notice the most phishing emails among the 205 participants and were 
also able to notice phishing in less time than the other attention span score groups. 
Attention span score nine group also noticed the most signs of phishing among all PAWS 











Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Attention Span Score Group (N=205) 
  
DV   Attn. Score       Mean      Std.Dev.      Std. Error 
ATN 3 4.25 .500 .250 
 7 4.25 .957 .479 
 9 5.00 .000 .000 
 10 4.75 .463 .164 
 11 4.84 .369 .065 
 12 4.70 .470 .105 
 13 4.53 .716 .113 
 14 4.57 .698 .085 
 15 4.32 .819 .097 
 16 4.50 .768 .084 
 17 4.69 .531 .066 
 18 4.55 .581 .061 
 19 4.55 .737 .085 
 20 4.30 .795 .120 
 21 4.49 .787 .093 
 22 4.37 .768 .106 
 23 4.42 .717 .146 
 24 4.13 .942 .166 
 25 4.33 .888 .256 
 26 4.38 .957 .239 
TTN 3 108.00 25.742 12.871 
 7 83.00 11.195 5.598 
 9 44.75 12.659 6.329 
 10 78.50 28.046 9.916 
 11 80.09 35.572 6.288 
 12 107.05 39.046 8.731 
 13 81.05 43.242 6.837 
 14 92.78 30.533 3.703 
 15 115.38 74.867 8.823 
 16 110.46 61.761 6.739 
 17 92.50 45.161 5.645 
 18 128.41 67.425 7.029 
 19 98.88 57.598 6.607 
 20 117.00 68.737 10.363 
 21 98.28 56.445 6.652 
 22 87.10 41.674 5.779 
 23 94.46 48.704 9.942 
 24 77.72 37.957 6.710 
 25 111.50 57.205 16.514 







Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Attention Span Score Group (N=205) – 
(cont.) 
DV   Attn. Score       Mean      Std.Dev.      Std. Error 
ATNS 3 2.00 .816 .408 
 7 2.50 1.732 .866 
 9 3.00 1.414 .707 
 10 2.38 1.685 .596 
 11 2.41 1.500 .265 
 12 2.40 1.273 .285 
 13 2.13 1.488 .235 
 14 2.04 1.215 .147 
 15 2.24 1.369 .161 
 16 2.19 1.322 .144 
 17 2.36 1.289 .161 
 18 2.23 1.384 .144 
 19 2.33 1.341 .154 
 20 1.64 1.163 .175 
 21 2.24 1.429 .168 
 22 2.29 1.499 .208 
 23 2.13 1.296 .265 
 24 2.22 1.601 .283 
 25 2.42 1.621 .468 
 26 2.25 1.291 .323 
Figure 41 






















Phase III – RQ6, RQ7 – Additional Analysis  
Additional analysis of all PAWS simulated email screens was also performed. As 
noted previously, 20 simulated emails were presented to the participants via mobile app 
downloaded to their personal mobile device. The simulated screens were presented in 
randomized group order (NAVH, AV, H, & AVH) and random email length by group. 
Data collected on individual participant performance included ability to notice phishing 
(clicking “Phishing” or “Legitimate”), time to notice phishing (time in seconds to click 
“Legitimate” or “Phishing”), and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails (clicking 
what sign of phishing the participant saw) for each of the 20 simulated email screens. 
Figure 44 illustrates the indication of the AV (audio and visual alerting) group 
was the best-performing group of the PAWS groups for ability to notice, time to notice, 
and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails. The number of simulated emails screens 
notices as phishing by the participants was 954 for the AV group, 902 for NAVH, 936 for 
H, and 894 for AVH group. Time to notice phishing for the AV group was an average of 
91 seconds, with NAVH averaging 113 seconds, H averaging 96 seconds, and AVH at 
105 seconds. Ability to notice signs of phishing in emails were 594 for the AV group, 











Sums and Averages for ATN, TTN, and ATNS for All Participants (N=205) 
 
 
 Table 28 itemizes each PAWS simulated email screen by correct clicks by the 
participant, number of TTN below the SME agreed time of 25 seconds for maximum 
time to notice phishing in emails, and correct clicks by the participant towards 
identification of signs of phishing in the specified simulated email screen. Figure 45 





Sums and Averages for PAWS Simulated Email Screens by Participant (N=205) 
PAWS Screen Version   Group ATN Clicks     TTN < = 25       ATNS 
 
1 UrgencyShort NAVH 200 119 27 
2 ActionLong NAVH 115 107 18 
3 InfoMed NAVH 170 125 36 
4 Spelling1 NAVH 199 191 98 
5 LinksShort NAVH 178 151 43 
6 UrgencyLong AVH 86 76 50 
7 Action1 H 198 174 48 
8 InfoLong AV  203 146 135 
9 SpellingShort AVH 203 192 149 
10 LinksMed H 169 152 70 
11 Urgency1 AV 195 191 139 
12 ActionMed AVH 199 134 106 
13 InfoShort H 187 184 161 
14 SpellingMed AV 199 174 108 
15 LinkLong AVH 201 138 100 
16 UrgencyMed H 183 167 11 
17 ActionShort AV 178 149 92 
18 Info1 AVH 203 192 149 
19 SpellingLong H 199 138 120 
















 The results and data collection were described in this chapter. Phase I results from 
the SME survey. SMEs voted on each question thus answering RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and 
RQ4. Answers from the survey validated constructs for the PAWS Mobile App. Phase II 
developed, designed, and tested the PAWS Mobile App. Phase III included the PAWS 
Mobile App study with participants.  
The results of  Phase I indicated the top signs of phishing, according to SMEs for 
this study were: sense of urgency, requiring action from the recipient, request for 




for the recipient to click on links. Findings from the SMEs survey also included visual 
icon matching for each sign of phishing, and a voice over warning announcing each sign 
of phishing. SMEs also indicated the mobile device should shake/vibrate upon seeing a 
phishing email to alert the recipient of a phishing email.  
Phase II successfully built the PAWS Mobile App from combining constructs 
determined by the SMEs in Phase I, and qualitative and quantitative testing, as well as 
pilot testing and user observation testing. Two rounds of testing were completed to ensure 
validity and accuracy of the study, and to ensure performance of the mobile app on both 
the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store.  
Phase III encompassed all of the PAWS Mobile App results based on data from 
205 participants. Participants downloaded the PAWS Mobile App to their personal 
mobile devices and participated in demographic questions, an attention span test, 20 
simulated phishing email screens, and post-PAWS questions. The results from the study 
indicated visual alerts and audible warnings help participants notice phishing emails, 
assist the participant in lessening the time it takes to notice phishing in emails, and to 
notice specific signs of phishing more accurately in emails.  
Statistically significant demographic results among the study participants 
indicated, 50-59 years old (12.7% of the participants) noticed more signs of phishing than 
other age groups, 21-29 years old (26.8%) of the participants noticed signs of phishing in 
the least amount of time. The female gender group (48.8% of the participants) and those 
choosing not to answer gender (2.0% of the participants) noticed phishing emails faster 
among gender groups. Participants without prior phishing training (42.9% of the 




choosing not to answer if they have received prior training. Participants with high 
attention span scores among the 205 participants noticed signs of phishing in emails and 








Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
 Alerts and warnings help people identify phishing emails sooner than if not 
presented with alerts and warnings. Audio alerts and visual warnings help participants 
notice what sign of phishing they saw in an email than without audio and visual alerts and 
warnings. Additionally, the number of participants clicking “Phishing” in under 25 
seconds was higher among the PAWS alert and warning groups than without.  
 The main goal of this study was achieved by creating a phishing alert and warning 
system that utilizes audio/visual/haptic alerts to assess participants’ ability to notice 
phishing emails and assess the time to notice the emails. The alert and warning system 
successfully measured both ability and time to notice phishing emails with favorable data 
indicating alerts and warnings helped participants both notice phishing and reduce the 
time it takes to notice phishing emails.  
Discussion  
Several limitations surrounded this study. This study was delivered during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. It is possible the pandemic affected the final participation numbers 
as participants were not readily accessible or able to be communicated with in order to 
explain the nature of the study. Increased participation for this version of the PAWS 
Mobile App could have been improved. Some participants felt the intro dissertation 
request looked like spam. A pre-request email could have possibly prevented this 
misunderstanding. Some participants were also wary of submitting their phone number to 




repeated text indicating the participants information will not be stored or used for any 
other purpose. For future iterations of PAWS, the de-identification of data text should be 
prominent in the invitational emails and on the PAWS mobile app itself.  
Some simulated email screens did not perform well among all 205 participants. 
Simulated email screen six, UrgencyLong with audio, visual, and haptic alerting was not 
a top performing email based on the length of time participants spent viewing the email, 
low click rates on “Phishing” and low click rates on identification of the sign of phishing. 
This could also be linked to the possibility of simulated screen placement, as it was 
number six in the screen order. This simulated email screen would have been the first 
time the participants saw a visual icon, heard the voice over warning, and felt the 
haptic/vibration feedback. Several participants noted post-study that they were surprised 
and/or freighted by the alerts and warnings upon first hearing and seeing them. This is a 
notable finding as it is possible this simulated email screen jolted participants into System 
2 thinking, and all reactions were slower, and more deliberate. Another explanation of 
this reaction from the participants (as it was the first time the participants heard an 
audible voice and were started) is the “Oh Shoot” syndrome. The participants’ reaction is 
an interesting finding as the participants found a voice-over to be a “novel” and 
“unexpected” alert or warning. Analyzing the participant reaction could be an area for 
future research.  
Simulated email screen 16 showed promising results as the majority of participants 
clicked “Phishing”, however, a low click rate of 11 for sign of phishing among the 
participants indicates this simulated email did not contain enough of the elements of 




haptic only group, therefore not assisting the participant with noticing the sign of 
phishing in the email through audio or visual assistance. It is recommended that 
additional analysis on the email screens for future iterations of the PAWS mobile app in 
order to accommodate for the potential for simulated email screen understandability, as 
well as tracking of the first email the participants “see and hear” to note if click rates are 
statistically differing from other simulated email screen click rates. Additionally, a text 
screen completely explaining that the PAWS Mobile App measures phishing 
identification and timing among participants may be helpful. Several participants 
indicated they were unsure what the app’s purpose was, or what the participant was 
supposed to be performing. Several issues were noticed in this study. Potential issues 
with confusion regarding why a voice was audibly saying the sign of phishing to the 
participant on the first audio alert. Other possibilities include the simulated email did not 
look “phishy” enough to the participant.  
Implications 
There are several implications for cybersecurity, social awareness, and phishing 
susceptibility reduction. This study implicates phishing email alerts and warnings applied 
and configured to email applications may play a significant role in the reduction of 
phishing susceptibility. This study also implicates training for an organization in phishing 
awareness as well as phishing training with alerts and warnings may play a significant 
role in the reduction of phishing susceptibility.  
Implications for Practice 
Corporations could potentially reduce the severity of phishing for both corporate 




User phishing awareness training is also important to reduce phishing susceptibility. 
Corporations could also perform deeper analysis on their demographic characteristics to 
determine more high-risk groups among age group, gender, prior phishing training, and 
attention span.  
Implications for Research 
 Implications for research indicate additional discovery on what 
audio/visual/haptic alerts and warning combinations could be created to further increase 
ability to notice, time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing among users. 
Deeper analysis on audio tone, frequency, voice, urgency, and character could identify 
with users with differing preferences on alerting. Visual icon analysis could also be 
investigated to improve visual feedback for the email recipient. Haptic vibrations could 
be researched to determine if frequency and intensity could assist the user more 
appropriately. Demographic studies could be performed to investigate deeper patterns 
within age group, gender, effects of phishing training, and attention span.  
Recommendations and Future Research 
 A deeper analysis on audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings for the PAWS 
Mobile App should be further performed. Customization for specific groups are also 
being constructed. Customization includes email, audio/visual/haptic pairings with 
demographics and background in mind. An addition of artificial intelligence to the 
PAWS Mobile App is also underway. Email filtering with alerts and warnings could be 
helpful towards combating the issue of phishing and social engineering. Additionally, 
hovering ability and link analysis could also be used for future research of the 




 The “Oh Shoot” syndrome, or the moment a participant realized they clicked on a 
phishing link can be more deeply explored as this research unexpectedly found the first 
simulated phishing email (In Group 2 - AVH) with audio, visual, and haptic alerting 
started participants and “slowed down” their reaction time. Those participants that 
followed up with the researcher after their experience with the PAWS Mobile App 
indicated they paid more attention after the first audio and visual alert and began 
questioning the steps they took for the rest of the simulated emails. Additional research or 
visual observation may add to this body of knowledge. 
Summary 
 In summary, alerts and warnings help users notice phishing emails more easily, 
and within less time than without alerts and warnings. This study indicates voice over 
combined with a visual alert is the best combination of alert and warning.  
The main research question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What 
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system combination can be used to empirically 
assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and  (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails on 
mobile devices and included RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4: 
RQ1: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of phishing in emails that are 
considered the most critical threats to users? 
RQ2: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings are most 
valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails?   
RQ3: What are the SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to




RQ4: What is the SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice 
signs of phishing in emails? 
 Phase I answered RQ1 as the top signs of phishing were identified according to 
SMEs. RQ2 was answered by pairing SME choices of audio/visual/haptic alerts and 
warnings with the top signs of phishing according to SMEs. RQ3 was answered as tasks 
for participants to perform during the study were collected and added to the PAWS 
Mobile App as data points. RQ4 was answered as 25 seconds was determined as the 
SMEs maximum time for ability to notice phishing in emails.  
 Phase II included the construction, programming, testing, and coding of the 
PAWS Mobile App and answered the following research question:  
RQ5: What validation and testing procedures should be considered in order to 
deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system prototype? 
RQ5 was answered by utilizing observation testing among pilot testers to 
determine data accuracy for the PAWS App. Qualitative observation and quantitative 
analysis and observation were combined to ensure accuracy of PAWS participant clicks 
and time (in seconds) to click “Phishing” or “Legitimate”. The PAWS Mobile App was 
successfully built, validated, tested, and delivered on the Apple App Store and the Google 
Play Store for participant download to their mobile device.  
Phase III included the delivery and participation of the PAWS Mobile App and 
answered the following research questions: 
RQ6a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 




RQ6b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to 
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS? 
RQ6c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS? 
RQ7a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) 
gender, (c) experience with phishing awareness training, and (d) attention 
span? 
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users time to 
notice phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) gender, (c) 
experience with phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention span? 
RQ7c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to 
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age, 
(b) gender, (c) prior phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention 
span? 
RQ6a, RQ6b, and RQ6c were answered by successfully indicating differences in 
PAWS groups with or without audio and visual warnings. Audio and visual warnings 
assisted participants in noticing signs of phishing, lessened the time to notice phishing 
among the participants, and increased the amount signs of phishing noticed. 
RQ7a, RQ7b, and RQ7c were answered by indicating some statistical mean 
differences among participants. Ability to notice signs of phishing was highest among the 
50-59 years old age group. Time to notice phishing in emails was fast among the 21-29 




choosing not to answer the gender demographic question. Ability to notice signs of 
phishing appeared stronger among those that had prior phishing training. Ability to notice 
phishing was stronger among those with high attention span scores. Time to notice 
phishing was faster among those with higher attention span scores as well.  
Overall, this study developed a phishing alert and warning system utilizing 
constructs determined by subject matter experts. The study results show statistically 
significant differences among participants presented with alerts and warnings on 
simulated phishing emails as compared to no alerts and warnings. Participants were able 
to notice phishing emails with the assistance of alerts and warnings, notice the phishing 
emails in less time, and correctly identify what sign of phishing they saw in the simulated 












Example of SME Participant Demographic Survey – Survey Monkey and 
PowerPoint Companion File Screenshots 
 
1. Which of the following describes your current job level? 
2. Owner/Executive/C Level 
• Senior Management 




3. How many years of experience do you have in information security? 
• Less than one year 
• At least one year, but less than 3 years 
• At least three years, but less than 5 years 
• At least 5 years, but less than 10 years 
• 10 years or more 
4. In your opinion, how significant of an issue is phishing? 
• Not at all significant 
• Low significance 
• Slightly significant 
• Neutral 
• Moderately significant 
• Very significant 
• Extremely significant 
5. Please rank the following signs of phishing in emails  
• Sense of urgency 
• Requiring action 
• Monetary gain  
• Misspelling and grammar issues 
• Greeting errors 
• Signature errors 
• Incorrect URL 
• Request to click on links 
• Request for information 
• Spoofed sender or content 
• Unsolicited attachment 
• Threatening language 
• Address mismatch 
• Highly personalized 





• 5 seconds 
• 15 seconds 
• 25 seconds 
• 35 seconds 
• 45 seconds 
• 55 seconds 
• 60 seconds 
7. What is the maximum amount of time to lapse before it is determined the recipient 
did not notice signs of phishing in the email? 
• 5 seconds 
• 15 seconds 
• 25 seconds 
• 35 seconds 
• 45 seconds 
• 55 seconds 
• 60 seconds 
• 65 seconds 
• 70 seconds 
• 75 seconds  
• 85 seconds 













































Example of PAWS Participant Demographic Survey 






• 60 or older 
2. Do you have at least one email account? 
• Yes 
• No 
3. Do you use a mobile device to check your email? 
• Yes 
• no 
4. What is your gender? 
• Male 
• Female  
• Prefer to not answer 





• Other – input field 






7. Have you participated in phishing training in the past? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Not sure 








Example of PAWS Participant Attention Span Test 
 








3. How difficult is it to concentrate on a friend talking to you while your favorite 
show is on? 
• Difficult 
• Moderately difficult 
• Not difficult 
4. How difficult is it for you to concentrate on what you are reading without re-
reading the page? 
• Difficult 
• Moderately difficult 
• Not difficult 


















Example of PAWS Participant Post-PAWS Test 
 
1. Did your mobile device shake at all during the PAWS test? 
• Yes 
• No 
2. Did you hear any sounds during the PAWS test? 
• Yes 
• No 
3. Did you experience any delays during the PAWS test (phone calls, notifications)? 
• Yes 
• No 
4. Do you have any questions or concerns? 
• Yes 
• No 












Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example of Email Phishing 


















Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example of Email Phishing 




































Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example of Email Phishing 










Example of SME Recruitment Message 
 
SME Recruitment Letter 
Dear Information Security Subject Matter Expert (SME), 
 
I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems at the College of Engineering and 
Computing of Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation is chaired by Dr. Yair Levy 
and this work is part of the Levy Cylab Projects (http://CyLab.nova.edu/). My research 
study is seeking to determine if audio, visual, and haptic alerting can reduce susceptibility 
of phishing emails.  
The experiment that I am seeking assistance with is aimed to develop an application 
comprised of audio, visual, and haptic alerting. The study will be a mobile application 
that participants download to their mobile device and partake in a simulated phishing test. 
The test consists of various screens. The screens are designed to look like phishing 
emails. Various sounds, visual icons, and shaking will occur to assist the participant in 
noticing signs of phishing in emails.  
I am requesting your help in a few areas of the PAWS design: 
 
1. Your ranking of the Top Signs of Phishing in Emails 
2. Your opinion regarding the most appropriate audio, visual, and haptic alerting 
elements to pair with signs of phishing in emails 
3. Your opinion on the appropriate time it should take for a participant to notice 
signs of phishing in emails 
4. Your opinion on the design of screens presented to the participant 
By participating in this research study, you agree and understand that your responses are 
voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no personal identifiable information will be 
collected or traced back to anyone. Of course, you may stop your participation at any 
time. As a token of appreciation for your security expert contribution to this research 
study you will receive a $10 Amazon digital gift card to your email address upon 
completing the survey instruments required to initiate this research study. 
 
I appreciate your assistance and contribution to this research study. If you wish to receive 
the findings of the study, feel free to contact me via email and I will be more than happy 
to provide you with the information about the academic research publication resulting 
from this study. 
Please let me know if you would like to participate in my SME survey. 
 
Best Regards, 
Molly Cooper, PhD Candidate in Information Systems and Cybersecurity 














I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems at the College of Engineering and 
Computing of Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation is chaired by Dr. Yair Levy 
and this work is part of the Levy Cylab Projects (http://CyLab.nova.edu/). I am seeking 
participants for my dissertation study.  
 
By participating in this research study, you agree and understand that your responses are 
voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no personal identifiable information will be 
collected or traced back to anyone. Of course, you may stop your participation at any 
time.  
 
If you would like to participate, please go to: 
Pawstest.com to download the PAWS Test App.  




Molly Cooper, PhD Candidate in Information Systems and Cybersecurity 


































Specific Data Collection Question 
or Screen 
Analysis 














Please rank the signs of phishing 





of choice among 
the SMEs will be 
chosen for the 
PAWS Mobile 
App. 





are most valid 
to pair with 
the top signs 
of phishing in 





A series of choice questions in the 
SME Survey: 
• The SMEs will indicate what 
their preferred audio sound 
for each sign of phishing in 
email. 1, 2, or 3. 
• The SMEs will indicate what 
their preferred visual icon is 
for each sign of phishing in 
email. 1, 2, or 3. 
• The SMEs will indicate what 
their preferred haptic alert 
timing is for each sign of 






of choice among 
the SMEs will be 
chosen for the 
PAWS Mobile 
App. 
RQ3 What are the 
SMEs’ 
validated 
tasks for the 
measures of: 
(a) ability to 
notice, and (b) 








(Ability) A choice of selections for 
screen presentation for PAWS 
Mobile App.  
 
(Ability) 
What determines a recipient’s ability 
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• Prior experience with 
phishing training 
• Attention Span 
(Time) How long should it take a 
recipient of a phishing email to 
notice signs of phishing? 
• 25 seconds 
• 30 seconds 
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(Tasks)What are some tasks that 
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• Clicking Phishing 
• Not clicking anything on the 
screen. 
• Clicking signs of phishing 
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• Clicking Phishing within a 
certain amount of time? 
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